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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING ON
GRADUATION RATES AT TEXAS STATE TECHNICAL COLLEGE
Adam C. Hutchison
Old Dominion University, 2018
Director: Dr. Mitchell Williams
As states legislatures seek improved results and increased accountability from higher
education institutions, performance-based funding is frequently used as fiscal policy to determine
state appropriations. Performance-based funding (PBF) determines an institution’s appropriation
by its attainment of metrics, usually student outcomes. Early versions of PBF provided incentive
funding for institutions that exceeded outcome goals, but later formulas included more
intermediate metrics and required institutions meet targets to receive baseline funding. Prior
studies examined the impact of PBF on retention and graduation rates at institutions through
state-to-state comparisons and explored the political implications of PBF policies. Researchers
found states using PBF did not improve student retention and graduation at greater rates than
non-PBF states and recommended improvements to future PBF formulas (Dougherty, Natow, &
Vega, 2012; Hillman, 2016; Shin, 2010).
Texas implemented the Returned Value Funding model, a PBF formula for Texas State
Technical College (TSTC), in 2013 to improve the institution’s completion rates (Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board, 2013). The model incorporated recommendations from prior
studies, including broad stakeholder collaboration, alignment with institutional mission, and a
large percentage of the college’s budget determined by PBF. This study addressed a gap in the
literature by evaluating the impact of the Returned Value Funding formula on TSTC’s graduation
rate at the institution as a whole and by academic divisions.
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The study used a matched sample design and an interrupted time series analysis to
evaluate the impact of the Returned Value Funding model on graduation rates between 2005 and
2016. The tests provided both point-in-time and longitudinal views of the effects of PBF on
graduation rates at TSTC. The results of both tests indicated PBF had no statistically significant
impact on graduation rates at TSTC as a whole and mixed effects on rates at individual academic
divisions.
The study recommends regular review of the outcomes of the Returned Value Funding
model and additional disaggregation of the impact of the model by TSTC campus and by
demographic populations. Research should also explore operational changes made by
institutions in response to PBF, and findings from ongoing research should be incorporated into
new or revised PBF formulas.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last 30 years, lawmakers and educational policy analysts have challenged
activity-based appropriation formulas as inefficient and counterintuitive systems to fund the
social service of public higher education (Dougherty, Natow, Hare, & Jones, 2011; Jones, 2012).
President Obama also advocated for increased accountability when, in his 2013 State of the
Union address, he called on Congress to link federal higher education funding to institutional
outcomes (The White House, 2013). As an alternative to enrollment-based models,
performance-based funding (PBF) is a method of determining an institution’s appropriation by
its attainment of key metrics, usually student outcomes. PBF has been used by some states and
higher education systems to determine budget allocations, and the PBF model has gained
popularity among legislators and private organizations. For example, the Lumina Foundation and
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have endorsed PBF as a means of improving the outcomes
for U.S. higher education (McKeown-Moak, 2013; Tandberg, Hillman, & Barakat, 2014).
Proponents of this type of funding model argue that the PBF system addresses the motivation for
colleges and universities to operate more efficiently and focus on a fundamental economic
mission to supply qualified individuals to the national workforce (Dougherty, Natow, Bork,
Jones, & Vega, 2013; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006).
Although there is support for PBF among education policy analysts and lawmakers,
implementation of the funding practice has been uneven and with mixed results (Dougherty et
al., 2013; Hillman, 2016). The financial and political positions of individual states, the wide
variances in the numerous models, and pushback from some stakeholders at colleges and
universities have impacted the adoption and effectiveness of PBF. As legislatures wrestle with
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spending at public institutions of higher education, educational leaders have expressed concern
about how changes to the funding formulas, specifically the implementation of PBF, affect their
historical missions and student success (Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Lahr, Dougherty, & Natow,
2014; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Rabovsky, 2012).
Researchers have approached the study of the impact of PBF qualitatively and
quantitatively. Hillman’s 2016 review of 12 quantitative studies on the impact of PBF on
colleges and universities between 1990 and 2012 found none of the plans used by the PBF states
resulted in a statistically significant improvement in educational outcomes for students (Hillman,
2016). In both state-level and national studies, researchers found that retention rates, graduation
rates, and levels of research funding were mostly unaffected by PBF. In the report, Hillman
(2016) concluded, “Despite each state having goals related to improving college completions,
their performance-based funding policies have not yet achieved the desired results” (p. 6).
Background
In 2016, higher education spending was the third largest expenditure of states’ budgets
(after elementary and secondary education and health care), and collectively states spent more
than $207 billion on higher education in fiscal year 2017 (National Association of State Budget
Officers [NASBO], 2017). Budgets for colleges and universities are comprised of a mix of
revenue sources, and state and federal funding combine for the largest portion of the budgets of
public institutions (Stauffer & Oliff, 2015). To determine the value of these allocations, most
states use institutional census-based formulas that correlate with student participation (SRI,
2012). These formulas include factors such as enrollment, credit hours, and contact hours, and
the more activity that institutions generate in these areas, the greater the potential allocation from
the state to the college. Combined with the tuition and fees paid by students, the majority of
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institutional budgets are determined by inputs into the system, such as enrollment and courses,
rather than outcomes such as graduation and job placement.
Performance-based funding reverses this traditional, enrollment-based allocation method
for higher education, and instead of determining appropriations based on inputs, relies on
outcome measurements. Burke and Modarresi (2001) identified three distinct approaches that
legislatures employ to tie postsecondary education outcomes to fiscal allocation: performance
funding, performance budgeting, and performance reporting. Performance funding links state
allocation to specific institutional metrics, while performance budgeting directs lawmakers and
higher education agencies to consider an institution’s performance during budget development.
The third approach, performance reporting, mandates regular assessment of institutions on stateestablished metrics, but this approach does not directly link allocation to metrics. Increasingly,
states are turning to performance-based funding in an effort to design funding that incentivizes
institutions to improve student outcomes (D’Amico, Friedel, Katsinas, & Thornton, 2014;
Hermes, 2012; Tandberg et al., 2014).
Advocates for performance-based funding have promoted this allocation methodology as
a means to align public dollars with the public interest, giving institutions the monetary incentive
to align their operations to yield higher returns on the state’s investment. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and the Lumina Foundation include PBF as public policy initiatives in their
work, as do Achieving the Dream and Jobs for the Future. The U.S. Department of Education
has challenged states to adopt PBF “based on progress toward completion and other quality
goals” (U.S. Department of Education, 2011, p. 10), and President Obama included the initiative
as part of his higher education strategy (U.S. Office of the President, 2013).
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Performance-based funding in the United States (U.S.) began in 1979 when institutional
leaders and Tennessee’s higher education agency developed a pilot program to allocate a portion
of state funding based on institutional metrics. Other states followed suit and developed their
own PBF formulas to determine portions of the allocations given to colleges and universities.
Through direct legislation or higher education agency policy, 26 states were operating with some
form of PBF by 2007 (Hermes, 2012). These early versions of PBF provided incentive funding
to institutions that met or exceeded performance targets, allowing colleges and universities to
grow their yearly budgets by focusing on predetermined metrics. Referred to as PBF 1.0, the
incentive funding formulas allocated additional monies to institutions but did not jeopardize
significant baseline funds (Dougherty et al., 2016; Lahr et al., 2014). However, many of these
funding formulas were discontinued by state legislatures in the mid-2000s because of lack of
institutional support, political changes, or economic shortfalls (Dougherty, Natow, & Vega,
2012).
During the economic recession of the late 2000s, state legislatures began reintroducing
performance metrics as a means of determining fiscal allocations. Unlike the bonus funding
provided through the early versions, PBF 2.0 required that institutions meet established
performance goals to receive full allocations. These newer performance-based funding formulas
included more intermediate metrics than early designs, and though the percentages of
institutional budgets allocated by this method varied widely among states, institutions did risk
shrinking budgets if they failed to meet the metrics. By 2015, 32 states had implemented some
form of PBF for public higher education, and several other states were planning to begin
performance funding within the next few years (National Conference of State Legislatures
[NCSL], 2015).
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As a public policy instrument, performance-based funding serves as more than just an
alternative to census-based enrollment allocation methods. Legislatures have implemented PBF
with the goal of improving the outcomes such as graduation and placement (Dougherty, Jones,
Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, & Reddy, 2016b). Therefore, researchers have examined the impact of
some PBF formulas around the country on their target measures. Early quantitative studies of
universities on PBF 1.0 revealed no short-term impact on graduation rates or research funding,
and the results were similar when researchers considered the formulas over a longer period of
time (Hillman, 2016). The studies reviewed by Hillman also found unintended changes in
institutional behaviors when universities operated under PBF 2.0, such has more selective
admissions criteria and less federal aid. Research on PBF at two-year colleges revealed mixed
results as some institutions increased their production of short, workforce-oriented certificates,
but no overall gains in associate degree graduates (Hillman, 2016).
Researchers have also evaluated the implementation and persistence of performance
funding as a public policy instrument through qualitative studies. After some states discontinued
the use of PBF 1.0, studies such as those conducted by Burke and Modarresi (2001) and Harbour
and Nagy (2006) reviewed the experiences of lawmakers and higher education leaders. Among
their findings, they observed a lack of support and collaboration by college leaders negatively
affected the institutions’ adoption of PBF and corresponding organizational changes.
Administrators were also concerned that objectives set in performance funding policies at the
state level ran contrary to their colleges’ missions and regional needs. Changing political
climates and priorities also undermined the longevity needed for performance funding to affect
institutional outcomes. Finally, because the budget amounts at stake in most PBF formulas were
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a small percentage of an institution’s total budget, colleges and universities were not motivated
to fully embrace the policies and make functional adjustments to achieve the target metrics.
Texas implemented two versions of PBF in 2013 when the 83rd Texas Legislature
established separate formulas for its community colleges and the state’s workforce education
institution, Texas State Technical College (TSTC). Prior to this new policy, all public two-year
colleges received their state allocation based on contact hours. TSTC is a regionally accredited,
public institution of 10 campuses serving about 14,000 students statewide, and it shares many of
the characteristics of a traditional community college, including open enrollment, general
academics, and developmental education. TSTC offers Associate of Science degrees (AS),
Associate of Applied Science (AAS) degrees, and Certificates of Completion, and the
instructional programs are categorized into academic divisions in accordance with targeted
industry sectors. Instructional programs are organized into divisions which include Academics;
Allied Health; Business and Professions; Computer and Information Technology; Engineering
and Electronics; Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources; Industrial and Manufacturing;
and Transportation.
In the development of TSTC’s performance funding formula, the Texas state legislature
addressed the shortcomings of PBF identified by research on other states. Lawmakers began
discussing PBF for public higher education in Texas in 2008 and directed the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board (THECB) to collaborate with the Comptroller’s Office to conduct
a feasibility study of PBF for TSTC. After a favorable review from the Comptroller’s Office, the
82nd Legislature in 2011 directed the THECB to finalize the formula with TSTC and other
relevant state agencies for implementation in 2013 (THECB, 2013). This cooperation among
state agencies for six years prior to the change in the allocation formula resulted in broad
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consensus among all stakeholders, including college leadership, concerning the methodology and
metrics of the formula. In consideration of TSTC’s statewide economic development mission,
the legislature established a PBF formula for the institution based on the earnings of its students
after they leave the college, and the formula applies 100% of its state allocation. Referred to as
the Returned Value Funding Model, the formula uses enrollment data from the college as
reported to the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and cross-references TSTC students
with unemployment insurance data collected by the Texas Workforce Commission (THECB,
2013). After students who complete at least one semester leave the college, their wages in Texas
are tracked for five years, and a percentage of the difference between their earnings and
minimum wages is returned to TSTC in the form of legislative appropriations. Dual credit
students are not included in the formula. For fiscal year 2016, TSTC’s appropriation was $93.9
million (H.B. 1, 2015).
Problem Statement
Researchers have identified lack of support from higher education leaders, conflict with
institutional mission, and inadequate funding as causes of failure in state PBF policies
(Dougherty, et al., 2011; Rabovsky, 2014). The development and implementation of the
Returned Value Funding Model for TSTC addressed these shortcomings of previous PBF
designs, but there are no studies found by this researcher that explore the impact of this type of
PBF formula on students. Because the Returned Value Funding Model incorporated
recommendations from prior research into a new formula, TSTC provided an opportunity to
explore the effects of this PBF model. While previous studies indicated little or no improvement
in institutional performance under PBF, it was not known if student completion rates at TSTC
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were affected by operational changes at the college that may have occurred in response to the
change in funding formula.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of performance-based funding on
graduation rates at TSTC. The study focused on the extent to which the implementation of the
Returned Value Funding Model affects graduation rates overall and by academic divisions at
Texas State Technical College.
Research Questions
The study was guided by the following research questions:
1. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in the overall graduation rate
at Texas State Technical College after the implementation of the Returned Value Fund
Model when compared to the graduation rate prior to the implementation of the
performance-based funding?
2. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in graduation rate by
academic divisions after the implementation of the Returned Value Funding Model when
compared to the graduation rate prior to performance-based funding?
The study examined the effect of PBF on graduation rates at TSTC; specifically, the study
focused on the extent to which the implementation of performance-based funding affected
graduation rates overall and by academic divisions at TSTC. In addition to disaggregation by
academic divisions, the findings were further evaluated through a comparative interrupted time
series study.
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Professional Significance of the Topic
Since the expansion of PBF in the early 2000s, researchers have studied PBF, but the
majority of these evaluations were qualitative and focused on the implementation of or reasons
for the discontinuation of PBF 1.0. The previous quantitative studies on performance funding in
the U.S. showed little or no improvement in graduation rates or retention rates at institutions
operating under PBF. In the recommendations of these prior studies, scholars suggested that the
performance of colleges and universities funded by PBF may improve if the amount of funding
at stake was sufficient to motivate organizational change (Cavanaugh & Garland, 2012; Shin,
2010). Research on the TSTC Returned Value Funding Model adds to the professional literature
because it examines a PBF formula that informs 100% of the state allocation for the college.
Hillman (2016) reported only two quantitative studies that specifically evaluated the
impact of PBF on two-year colleges. The largest of these studies covered a 20-year period of
PBF in 19 states, including Texas, and it found little evidence of overall improvement in student
outcomes (Tandberg et al., 2014). However, the researchers did not consider the Returned Value
Funding Model at TSTC, which was implemented after the data used in the study. Further, the
study did not include all graduates, but instead focused only on Associates degrees while
excluding workforce certificates (Tandberg et al., 2014). Therefore, this evaluation of the TSTC
model filled a gap in the existing literature by examining the impact of this new PBF formula on
two-year college programs which are focused on workforce preparation.
Prior studies also recommended PBF models should be developed in consideration of
colleges’ missions in their respective states and communities (Tandberg et al, 2014), accounting
for variations in institutional purpose with adjustments to metrics. In development of the TSTC
Returned Value Funding Model, policy makers intentionally aligned the institutional mission of
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economic development with funding formula goal of increased wages for TSTC students. The
first-year earnings for TSTC students were highest among technical program graduates, creating
an incentive for TSTC to improve graduation rates. This study may inform future efforts in PBF
development at other two-year colleges to align performance targets with the missions of
institutions in order achieve successful student outcomes. Previously published studies of
performance funding evaluated the effects of PBF at the state level, but not at individual
institutions (Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014; Rabovsky, 2012; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2007).
By examining the impact on graduation rates for the college and among program areas at TSTC,
this research identified technical education disciplines more affected by PBF than others. This
information is useful for higher education leaders and policy makers to design more effective
funding formulas that account for differences among industry sectors.
Finally, the study also established a baseline for ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness
of the formula for TSTC. College leaders have expressed interest in continuous examination of
the Returned Value Funding Model in order to provide data-driven feedback to legislators on its
impact, and this study may provide information that may be useful for future refinement of the
model.
Overview of the Methodology
The current study was a quasi-experimental, quantitative study, using two statistical tests
to compare graduation rates before and after the implementation of PBF in 2013. All data used
in this study were collected by TSTC and maintained in its student data system, including
demographic and academic information. The data were cross-referenced with the publicly
available data from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board for verification.
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TSTC’s annual fall enrollment remained steady between 9,000 and 12,000 students from
2000 and 2015, with the exception of a spike from 2008 through 2011. The spike in enrollment
during those years may have been caused by federal spending on education through the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or the reauthorization of the Higher
Education Opportunity Act in 2008, which included a year-round Pell Grant provision. While
the causes of the enrollment increase during those years are beyond the scope of this study, the
growth represents an anomaly in TSTC’s enrollment trend. Therefore, the current study used a
matched sample of students who enrolled in 2005 and a sample from 2009 for comparison to a
matched sample of students who enrolled in 2013.
The final samples were matched using the following student demographics:
1. full- or part-time student status,
2. gender,
3. academically disadvantaged,
4. economically disadvantaged, and
5. academic division.
To evaluate the impact of PBF in program discipline areas, the study divided the
programs into academic divisions based on discipline area. In 1980, the U.S. Department of
Education (USDOE) established the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) taxonomy to
categorize academic fields of study, and this structure allows for consistent tracking and
reporting of student and institutional data (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES],
2017). TSTC’s technical programs fit into 11 of the 49 CIP codes. TSTC further organizes its
programs into academic divisions of related programs to promote operational efficiencies and
provide a consistent management structure. Over the length of this study, changes in curriculum
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and program focus areas resulted in revisions to the college catalog, and some programs were
eliminated, other programs were significantly altered, and new programs were introduced.
However, the program emphases of the academic divisions remained consistent and provided an
appropriate framework to evaluate the impact of PBF on student graduation in specific academic
program areas. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the effects of PBF on individual
programs offered at TSTC. The list of seven academic divisions and related programs that were
evaluated in this study is presented in Appendix A, though the common program names are listed
and may not reflect the exact program name for each year of the study. For the purposes of this
study, students enrolled in a program altered during the timeframe of the study were matched
with students in the corresponding program sharing substantively the same learning outcomes.
Statistical methods. After establishing the matched pairs of new students in Fall 2005 to
new students in Fall 2013 and new students in Fall 2008 to new students in Fall 2013, the
graduation rates of the samples were evaluated by a two-tailed z test between the two
proportions. Previous quantitative research on the impact of PBF on graduation rates indicated
no statistically significant increase in the graduates at institutions after PBF (Rutherford &
Rabovsky, 2014; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Shin, 2010; Shin & Milton, 2004; Umbricht,
Fernandez, & Ortagus, 2015; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2007). Therefore, the null hypothesis for
this study proposed no statistical difference in graduation rates between students at TSTC before
the implementation of PBF and after PBF began. The z tests were conducted for the matched
samples as a whole and also for each sub-sample of academic division to examine the statistical
significance of the differences between graduation rates in program areas.
Additionally, an interrupted time series design was employed to evaluate the impact of
the application of PBF in 2013 on the institution as a whole and on academic divisions.
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Frequently used in public policy research, interrupted time series analysis was appropriate
because of the non-experimental nature of this study, and it accommodated multiple data points
collected both before and after the implementation of PBF. The data were further disaggregated
by academic divisions.
Delimitations
The current study was confined to the Returned Value Funding Model at TSTC. Though
Texas uses a performance-based funding formula to determine some of the appropriations to its
community colleges, the allocation method for TSTC is distinct. The college is the only
statewide technical college in Texas, and its legislative mission includes contribution to the
economic development of the state (Texas Education Code §135, 2017). In light of this charge,
the 83rd Texas Legislature implemented a performance-based funding formula that reflected
TSTC’s impact on the economy through graduates’ wages. This study did not consider the
graduation rates of TSTC students as compared to area community colleges or other state
technical colleges nationwide.
The research also excluded two groups of certificate graduates from TSTC. Advanced
Technical Certificates and Enhanced Skills Certificates are awards approved by the THECB but
not considered degrees or Certificates of Completion. Advanced Technical Certificates require
an associate’s or bachelor’s degree as a prerequisite, must be clearly related to the prerequisite
degree, and must be relevant to industry or external agency requirements. Similarly, Enhanced
Skills Certificates consist of optional courses identified by industry, and they are awarded
concurrently with the related AAS (THECB, 2015a). The TSTC campuses did not consistently
incorporate these awards into their curricula, and after changes in financial aid eligibility for the
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certificates, less than 10 students completed Advanced Technical Certificates or Enhanced Skills
Certificates at TSTC between 2005 and 2013.
Dual credit students at TSTC are high school students taking TSTC courses for which the
participating school districts also give high school credit. Because of the low matriculation rate
of dual credit students to TSTC after completing high school, the THECB and TSTC leadership
agreed that these students should not be included in the Returned Value Funding Model.
Therefore, dual credit students were not included in this study.
Finally, the study did not include students completing the Academic Core and AS
degrees. The TSTC campus in Harlingen, Texas is more than 30 miles from the nearest
community college, and that location is exclusively authorized to offer the Core and AS degrees
in support of the area need for transferrable academic awards (Texas Education Code §135,
2017). These awards were not incorporated in the study because neither of the awards were
designed for immediate economic impact, and they were not offered at the other nine TSTC
campuses.
Definition of Key Terms
The following key terms were used in this study:
Academically disadvantaged student: a student who, based on state- or locally-approved
placement tests, did not have college entry level skills in reading, writing, or
mathematics. This definition also applied to students who did not receive a high school
diploma nor a GED certificate (THECB, 2016d).
Academic divisions: administratively determined classifications of instructional
programs by subject area or Classification of Instructional Programs code (NCES, 2017).
Cohort: a group of students who declared a given major in the same term
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Economically disadvantaged student: a student who meets one of the following criteria:
•

Annual income at or below the federal poverty line,

•

Eligible for Pell Grant or comparable need-based educational assistance,

•

Eligible for job training programs included under Title II of the U.S.
Department of Labor Job Training Partnership Act,

•

Eligible for public assistance programs such as the Women, Infants, and
Children and Families with Dependent Children programs, or

•

Eligible for assistance under the Food Stamp Act of 1977 or the Health and
Human Services Poverty Guidelines (THECB, 2016d).

Full-time student: a student enrolled in at least 12 credit hours per semester.
Gender: a student who self-reported as male or female (THECB, 2016d).
Graduate: a student who completed his or her declared program of study in 150% of
normal time or less (NCES, 2016).
Graduation rate: the total number of completers in a sample divided by the total number
of students in the sample (NCES, 2016).
Part-time student: a student enrolled in less than 12 credit hours per semester
Performance-based funding: a method of determining an institution’s fiscal appropriation
by its attainment of key metrics, usually student outcomes.
Returned Value Funding Model: the performance-based funding formula established by
the Texas legislature in 2013 for Texas State Technical College (THECB, 2013).
Summary
With 32 states actively linking budget allocation to performance metrics, PBF is no
longer considered a novel approach to public funding of higher education. This method of
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incentive funding is designed to motivate institutions to organizationally focus on successful
outcomes for students, and the model has received broad public policy support. However,
research on PBF indicates that institutions publicly funded based on performance metrics have
not statistically improved graduation rates. The Returned Value PBF design for TSTC presented
an opportunity to evaluate a new type of performance formula that was developed with college
leaders, accounted for all of its state funding, and was aligned with its institutional mission.
Further, this study examined the impact on graduation rates for the college as a whole, as well as
academic divisions, adding to the professional significance of the proposed study. The following
chapters present a review of the relevant literature on the policy implementations and
performance of PBF in the U.S. and an explanation of the methodology of the proposed study.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Performance-based funding (PBF) in higher education is not new, but it is a significant
departure from the historical method of state funding to colleges and universities. PBF models
gained popularity in the early 2000s, spurred by public calls for greater accountability and
shrinking government allocations, and this led to studies and reviews by higher education
researchers and public policy groups (Alexander, 2000; Burke, Minassians, & Nelson, 2003).
The changes to existing education financing methods, planned expansion of PBF to additional
states, and increased promotion of PBF models by private advocacy groups have led to an
increase of available literature to examine the historical and current contexts for PBF, as well as
its impact at public colleges and universities.
Purpose of the Literature Review
This literature review presents information related to public funding of higher education,
primarily in the U.S., and it provides context for the study of the impact of PBF at Texas State
Technical College. The review includes methods and trends for public funding of two-year
colleges, the theoretical foundations for PBF, the implementation of PBF, and an examination of
select qualitative and quantitative studies of the impact of PBF on colleges and universities.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence and focus of the literature review.
Method of the Literature Review
The researcher examined selected journal, magazine, and periodical articles identified by
queries in electronic library databases, such as EBSCO, Wiley Online, and the Education
Resources Information Center (ERIC). Search terms included performance-based funding,
community college funding, and performance-based funding in higher education. Additionally,
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the review of literature identified relevant information in published qualitative and quantitative
studies and applicable statistical data published by states and policy groups. Finally, the review
included examination of relevant books on recent community college innovation, community
college finance, and performance funding for higher education.

Figure 1. Literature review topic funnel diagram.
Overview of Funding of Public Two-Year Colleges
The 1947 Truman Report marked a turning point in the role of the two-year college in
American higher education, promoting the establishment of community colleges that prepared
students for the workforce or transfer to university (Gilbert & Heller, 2013).

Though there

were approximately equal numbers of private and public two-year colleges in the 1950s, the role
of the community college as a public entity expanded greatly from 1960 to 1980. By 2010, more
than 91% of community colleges in the United States were public (Mullin, Baime, & Honeyman,
2015). The enrollment in community colleges grew rapidly during the same time period, and
more than 12 million students were enrolled in community colleges in 2014 (American
Association of Community Colleges [AACC], 2016). Community colleges receive funding from
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three primary sources: state appropriations, local revenue, and student tuition and fees, which
includes financial aid awarded to students, such as Pell Grants. State appropriations include
monies allocated by the state directly to institutions through legislative or agency formulas; local
revenue is determined by local taxes or contributions, usually tied to property values.
State appropriations. All 50 states allocate a portion of revenue to its public colleges
and universities, though amounts vary (Mullin et al., 2015). Public funding for higher education
in the U.S. is a discretionary expense, not required by the federal or state governments, and
Zumeta (1995) asserted that because it is discretionary, public funding for colleges and
universities often functions as a budget balancer. When states experience a budget shortfall,
public higher education funding is among the first areas cut by legislators in order to fund other
priorities, and Delaney and Doyle (2011) suggested college and university budgets were targeted
because institutions can raise revenue from tuition and fees.
In 2015, a total of $80.9 billion was allocated by states for higher education (Illinois
State, 2015), and in competition with four-year institutions, two-year colleges received between
10% and 20% of state revenue allocated for higher education (Mullin, 2010; National
Association of Budget Officers, 2014). The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
reported that state appropriations totaled about 23% of all community college revenue in 20112012 (as cited in Mullin et al., 2015, p. 47), though the percentage of an institution’s total budget
made up by appropriations varies from state to state. These state funds are historically linked to
the student population, either by student enrollment or contact hours.
Local taxing districts. In addition to state legislative allocations, 25 states, including
Texas, authorize taxing and service districts to provide revenue and define operational
boundaries for community colleges. These taxing districts are also used for matters of
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governance, such as determining eligible board members. The financing provided by these local
communities, usually in the form of assessed property taxes, may support facilities, equipment,
or other infrastructure needs, and through the local board, taxpayers can exercise influence on
their investments. For fiscal year 2012, local taxes comprised 17% of all community college
revenues (Mullin, et al., 2015).
Tuition and fees. The largest source of revenue for community colleges is based on the
tuition and fees that institutions charge to students for courses. Though tuition and fee rates vary
by institution and by state, the national average annual tuition and fees for community colleges in
2015-2016 was $3,430 (AACC, 2016). Students remit payment to the institution directly or, in
the case of some students, use federal financial aid such as Pell Grant or federal loans. In 20112012, approximately 57% of community college students received federal grants or loans to fund
their education (Juszkiewicz, 2014). For the purposes of this literature review, the category of
tuition and fees includes revenues received directly from students and federal non-operating
grants, the NCES classification for the Pell Grant. These two sources combined to make up 38%
of community college revenues in 2011-2012 (Mullin et al., 2015).
State appropriations, local property taxes, and tuition and fees, including Pell Grant,
comprise approximately 78% of the $58.4 billion of community college revenues in 2011-2012
(AACC, 2016). The remaining balance of revenue comes from a combination of federal, state,
and local grants, contracts, and fundraising.
Theoretical Perspectives for Performance-Based Funding
Advocates for performance-based funding policies promoted this method of funding as a
way of creating business-like financial incentives for educational institutions to operate more
efficiently and focused. Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, and Reddy (2016b) linked this

21
“financial-incentives theory of action” (Chapter 1, Section 5, para. 2) to two theoretical
perspectives: the principle-agent theory and resource dependency theory. These conceptual
frameworks describe the underpinnings for most performance funding formulas in the United
States.
Principle-agent theory. Principle-agent theory centers on economic investment by one
party, the principle, into the activities of another, the agent; and it focuses on measures
implemented by the principle to manage the behavior of its contracted agent (Dougherty et al.,
2011; Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014; Lahr et al., 2014). States spend more than 10% of
their discretionary budgets on higher education on average, and public colleges and universities
rely heavily on state appropriations for continued operations NASBO, 2014). Governments
contract with colleges and universities to provide the social service of public higher education,
and these institutions act as agents for the state (McLendon et al., 2006; Nisar, 2015). In the case
of PBF, states that provide public financing to an institution may set clear goals that are in the
investor’s interest and are measurable in objective ways. If the institution meets those goals, it
receives funding from the state (Hillman et al., 2014). While colleges and universities may
comply with the legislated standards to receive their fiscal allocation, they also have their own
priorities, in addition to the legislative metrics. Therefore, the principle should provide the
oversight and consequences, if necessary, to ensure the agent fulfills the implicit or explicit
contract (Lahr et al., 2014). Lahr, Dougherty, and Natow (2014) suggested the principle agent
theory applied to higher education through PBF is political science in nature, which “allows for
multiple principles (such as different regulatory agencies) and even agents” (p. 6). Even when
the performance metrics do not explicitly direct operational activities, the existence of the
standards may be seen as means of control over an organization (Lewis, 2015). The principle-
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agent relationship between state government and public higher education institutions, though not
strictly contractual, provides the conceptual framework that compels institutions to operate by
their state’s legislative mandates.
Resource dependency theory. The second theoretical framework for PBF is resource
dependency theory. This theory posits that an institution must regularly participate with other
organizations within its environment to secure resources and operate effectively (Hillman,
Withers, & Collins, 2009; McKinley & Mone, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This theory may
be applied because public colleges rely on cooperative relationships with other entities, such as
secondary school districts, state higher education agencies, accreditors, and federal government
agencies, for their ongoing success (Jaquette, 2006). In the case of PBF, colleges and
universities are dependent on state appropriations, and therefore college leaders will make
operational adjustments, implement strategies, and make required changes to preserve or
increase their institution’s funding from the state (Nisar, 2015). When state legislatures enact
PBF for higher education agencies, colleges are expected to respond by implementing strategies
designed to align the institution’s performance to the funded metrics (Rabovsky, 2012).
According to resource dependency theory, more significant and meaningful institutional
behavior changes will take place when more resources are at stake (Nisar, 2015).
History of Performance-Based Funding in the United States
PBF policies grew in popularity during the 2000s as state legislatures shifted their focus
to institutional outcomes rather than organizational management, but it is not a new practice in
the U.S. (McLendon & Hearn, 2013). In 1979, college and university leaders in Tennessee
worked directly with the state’s higher education agency to implement the nation’s first PBF
formula and piloted it among some Tennessee institutions. Though it was not a direct result of
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legislation, the policy development was supported by federal grants and private foundations, and
the initial model informed future policy decisions in the state to expand PBF (Dougherty et al.,
2011).
Performance-based funding 1.0. Connecticut and other states soon developed their
own programs to provide funding to institutions of higher education based on student outcomes,
and by 2007, 26 states had passed legislation or higher education policies to fund PBF programs
for at least some of their colleges and universities (Hermes, 2012). These initial formula designs,
also referred to as PBF 1.0, provided incentive monies to colleges and universities if
performance targets were met, allowing institutions to increase their budgets over their baseline
funding allocations (Dougherty et al., 2016b; Lahr et al., 2014). PBF 1.0 formulas focused
primarily on key performance measures such as retention or developmental education
completion and financial rewarded institutional improvements in those areas. (D’Amico et al.,
2014; Dougherty, et al., 2016b; Dougherty, Jones, & Natow, 2014: Dougherty & Reddy, 2011;
Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Hermes, 2012).
Researchers at the State University of New York conducted several studies on PBF 1.0
and collected data about states’ adoption of various performance funding systems (Burke &
Minassians, 2004; Burke, Minassians, & Nelson, 2003). Among their findings, Burke and his
colleagues observed “the shift away from performance funding to the less costly and less
controversial option of performance reporting” as the formulas were discontinued (Mullin, 2014,
p. 116). Because PBF 1.0 formulas offered additional monies to colleges and universities when
targets were met, these policies were subject to shrinking state revenues or shifting political
priorities (Dougherty et al., 2011). Shulock (2011) proposed four reasons for the discontinuation
of PBF 1.0:
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1. the policies affected a small percentage of institutional budgets;
2. the policies were not aligned with the colleges’ missions;
3. the policies set unreasonable targets; and
4. the policies were set up as pilot programs, putting them at risk for ongoing funding.
In a review of 60 studies of eight states using PBF 1.0 and national completion data, researchers
found these policies influenced organizational planning and strategy, but they did not find “firm
enough evidence that performance funding significantly increases rates of remedial completion,
retention, and graduation” (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013, p. 79).
Performance-based funding 2.0. Concurrent with the economic downturn 2007-2008, a
second generation of performance funding emerged. These formulas eliminated bonus or
additional funding when institutions achieved or exceeded their performance goals and instead
required institutions to meet their targets in order to receive full base funding from the legislature
(D’Amico et al., 2014; Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty et al., 2016b; McLendon & Hearn,
2013; Tandberg et al., 2014). In addition to changing from a bonus to a base funding formula,
this new iteration, or PBF 2.0, was also distinct from early performance funding models as it
placed greater emphasis on the economic impact of degree production and skill attainment
(McLendon & Hearn, 2013). PBF 2.0 policies improved the design process of performance
funding by including a broader range of stakeholders to promote alignment between fiscal
priorities and the states’ educational goals (Friedel, Thornton, D’Amico, & Katsinas, 2013).
Dougherty and Reddy (2011) also observed that PBF 2.0 included more metrics related to
intermediate achievement, such as “successful completion of developmental education courses or
programs; passage of key gateway courses … and reaching certain credit thresholds such as 15
or 30 credits” (p. 6). PBF 2.0 formulas also committed greater percentages of state higher
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education budgets to the achievement of designated metrics than PBF 1.0 formulas (Mullin et al.,
2015). Massachusetts and Ohio, for example, both allocate 50% of their state’s funding to
community colleges based on student outcomes (NCSL, 2015).
Implementation of Performance-Based Funding
By 2015, 32 states employed some type of PBF using metrics such as degree completion,
transfer rate, and time to degree, and five other states were in various stages of transition to
performance formulas (NCSL, 2015). McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) concluded
“legislative party strength and higher-education governance arrangement” (p. 11) were the most
significant characteristics of states that adopt PBF. Despite broad implementation of PBF, the
systems employed by states are inconsistent, as each state operates with different metrics and
various funding levels (NCLS, 2015). Within states, adjustments to formulas and metrics
challenge higher education leaders to strategically achieve PBF goals. Dougherty and Natow
(2009) observed, “states that have enacted performance funding have often and sometimes
substantially changed the amount of funding they devote to it and the criteria by which they
award that funding” (p. 1).
Bailey, Jaggars, and Jenkins (2015) asserted that the recent national emphasis on
performance funding was prompted by at least several factors. First, after the passage of the
Student Right-To-Know Act (1990), the public could evaluate the low graduation rates at public
community colleges through federally-required disclosure on college websites. Additionally,
college completion became increasingly viewed as the path to economic stability after the
downturn in 2008-2009. Finally, Bailey et al. (2015) posited that because the price of higher
education has risen much faster than other goods and services, there has been increased scrutiny
of college tuition costs, which has stimulated the discussion on PBF.
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Research on Implementation of Performance-Based Funding
PBF has encountered some resistance by colleges and universities, and not all higher
education administrators have embraced this allocation method. Studies related to states’
adoption of PBF have noted that many college and university leaders often oppose PBF, and
their resistance contributed to changes in state policy that reversed PBF (Dougherty, Natow, &
Vega, 2012; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Rabovsky (2014) found administrators generally
supported the use of performance metrics for institutional planning and internal budget, but they
opposed using PBF as a means of funding allocation. Institutional leaders explained their
resistance was “not because they are opposed to performance management in principle, but
rather because they perceive the policies as ineffective and perhaps harmful” (Rabovsky, 2014,
p. 771). Higher education administrators have also expressed concerns over the types of the
measures used and the impact of these policies on their institutions (Fryar, Rabovsky, &
Moynihan, 2012; Huisman & Currie, 2004), and leaders doubted the link between state
performance measures and the instructional mission (Harbour & Nagy, 2006). Additional
research found that opposition within the ranks of higher education institutions was instrumental
in the discontinuation of PBF in some states (Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Dougherty et al., 2012).
The research presented by Fryar et al. (2012) revealed a wide variety of opinions about
the value of PBF among leaders at four-year universities in Texas. While some presidents and
chancellors interviewed for the study appreciated the role of the state legislatures in determining
the metrics of the PBF formula, they did not believe the policy would lead to improved
graduation rates. Further, administrators expected little or no improvement in their institution’s
finances as a result of PBF. To improve the likelihood of successfully implementing
performance funding, the authors asserted that legislatures should support a diversity of
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measures and sustain a long-term commitment to gain administrators’ buy-in (p. 27). Nisar
(2015) used the term “neo-institutionalism” (p. 295) to describe the interaction of individuals and
organizations in response to proposed institutional change, and he posited that internal
organizational contexts, such as a college culture or faculty perspectives, play a significant role
in the adoption of PBF as public policy. In order to implement organizational changes intended
to change institutional behaviors, such as performance funding, Nisar (2015) stated these policies
“must be devised in consultation with such institutions” (p. 295).
Burke and Minassians (2004) collected information on the types of performance metrics
used by legislatures and agencies to review institutional performance. Community colleges
under PBF were most often required to report on enrollment, retention, transfer, and graduation
rates, indicating, according to the research methodology, an emphasis on efficiency over quality.
More importantly, researchers found that campus leaders primarily responsible for those
performance metrics were unaware or uniformed about the reporting, and they proposed this lack
of information may result in lack of improvement on the designated metrics (Burke &
Minassians, 2004).
Some states have reversed course and abandoned PBF in part or totally. Dougherty,
Natow, and Vega (2012) found half of the states that adopted performance funding policies
between 1979 and 2010 “later dropped or suspended their performance funding systems” (p. 3).
Researchers have examined the causes of the failure of PBF in those states and identified several
factors. Burke and Modarresi (2001), studied Florida, Ohio, and South Carolina, and they
observed that opposition from campus administrators, lack of interest from business leaders, and
insufficient time for planning and implementation of PBF doomed the policies in those states.
Dougherty, Natow, and Vega (2012) followed this study, confirming Burke and Modarresi’s
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(2001) report, and added state budget shortages and political turnover as key factors in states’
decisions to abandon PBF. Additional subsequent studies in Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and
Washington confirmed these findings (Dougherty et al., 2011; Lahr et al., 2014). Sanford and
Hunter (2011) suggested that the low percentage of higher education funding coming from states
that were committed to PBF contributed to the policy’s failure in those states. In a recent
investigation of institutional responses to PBF, researchers found that college leaders were
reactive to changes that may impact funding, and faculty and other managers understood how
their work influenced the budget through PBF (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, & Reddy,
2016a). However, administrators also reported that their strategic goals are driven by other
stakeholders and initiatives, not just PBF.
PBF policies that target outcome measures without consideration for at-risk populations
may adversely impact minority students, and this population was more likely to attend
community colleges than other public higher education institutions (Baime & Baum, 2016;
Jones, 2014). Researchers identified this risk early in PBF 1.0, and some states addressed it by
including minority or at-risk metrics in their policies (Dougherty et al., 2010; Miao, 2012;
Rabovsky, 2012). However, Texas, among other states, did not apply a factor or measurement
for at-risk students, and researchers found this population generated the least amount of funding
from the community college PBF model, possibly reducing the incentive for colleges to serve atrisk students (McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015). Jones (2014) urged caution for lawmakers seeking
to implement PBF at minority-serving institutions, noting that these colleges may need different
metrics than other public colleges and improvements in data collection tools in order to perform
comparably to predominately white institutions.
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Researchers also examined the role of state politics in PBF implementation. During the
development period of many PBF 1.0 policies, Republican-led state governments were more
likely to cut or restrict the growth of higher education funding (Delaney & Doyle, 2011), and
researchers found that the probability of a state’s adoption of PBF was positively correlated to
the proportion of Republicans in its legislature (Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016; Li, 2017; McLendon
et al., 2006). For example, the Republican majority in the state legislature was responsible for
establishing PBF in Washington State in 1997, but the formula was abandoned after Democrats
gained seats in the legislature the following year (Dougherty et al., 2010; Dougherty et al., 2012).
Li (2017) examined the adoption of PBF by state legislatures and reported a positive correlation
between PBF policies and rapid growth in unemployment. Further, non-PBF states adjacent to
states with performance funding delayed adoption of PBF until the policy effects could be
determined, a phenomenon Li (2017) referred to as “reverse policy diffusion” (p. 1).
Blankenberger and Phillips (2016) examined the development of PBF in Illinois, which
implemented the policy as part of the state’s higher education completion agenda. Illinois used a
PBF 1.0 model from 1999 through 2002, but it allocated less than 0.5% of community colleges’
budgets and was abandoned due to the state’s fiscal crisis (Dougherty et al., 2011). Studying the
process through the lens of politics and the public budgeting process, the researchers found the
movement back to outcomes-based budgeting was influenced by the state’s ongoing financial
deficits. However, Illinois was successful in implementing PBF 2.0 by including a broad range
of stakeholders in the development process, including elected officials, business leaders, higher
education board members, faculty, and college administrators (Blankenberger & Phillips, 2016).
In a review of PBF research, Friedel et al. (2013) did identify some positive outcomes
from the policy implementation. Within the institutions studied, there was greater awareness of
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the connections among goals, the states’ agendas, and the colleges’ outcomes, and they observed
that administrators and leaders used organizational data more frequently for planning and making
decisions (p. 9). Mullin (2014) noted the highest value of PBF was the input the policies gave to
external stakeholders over institutional operations. To improve the implementation of PBF
among colleges, researchers recommended that states should invest in the technology and
research capacities of community colleges to more effectively monitor institutional performance
on the target metrics (Jones, Dougherty, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, & Reddy, 2015). Further, they
suggested that college leaders should collaborate in “communities of practice” (p. 32) to identify
and discuss best practices among similar institutions adopting PBF. Jenkins, Ellwein, and
Boswell (2009) recommended that states adopt a “learning year” (p. 7) or progressively adopted
to help institutions adapt operations to the new policies.
Research on Impact of Performance-Based Funding
While researchers have explored the development and implementation of PBF, few
studies have examined the impact of PBF on institutions and students. States do not use a single
formula or common metric, making comparison among PBF states difficult and imprecise (Ewell
& Jones, 2006; Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Tandberg, 2008; Thornton & Friedel, 2016).
In their study of performance funding on Pennsylvania colleges and universities, Hillman,
Tandberg, and Gross (2014) acknowledged the limitations of evaluating student success data
among PBF states. In one of the early studies focused on PBF, Shin and Milton (2004)
examined graduation rates for First Time in College (FTIC) students in Tennessee, a
performance metric tied to funding of the state’s universities. Their study found the same rate of
increase in graduation among FTIC students in non-PBF states as occurred in Tennessee. A
second study by Shin in 2010 found that regardless of the higher education governance system,
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or the length of time the policy had been in place, PBF “did not bring changes in institutional
performance” (Shin, 2010, p. 63). Additional study of Tennessee’s funding model concluded the
system did not improve retention or graduation rates, and performance still did not improve
when the funding allocation affected by PBF was raised from 2% to 5% (Sanford & Hunter,
2011).
Measuring Up was a self-described “report card” of states’ education performance by the
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, and it was supported by grants from
two PBF advocacy groups, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Lumina Foundation
for Education (McKeown-Moak, 2013; Measuring Up, 2008). Based on data in these reports,
McLendon, Tuchmayer, and Park (2009) analyzed retention and completion rates of eight states,
including Pennsylvania and Arkansas, which used PBF. Though Pennsylvania used
performance-based funding during each year studied, the researchers found little difference in
retention and completion among the states in the study, regardless of PBF.
In the first study of Indiana’s PBF system, Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus (2015)
evaluated the performance of the state’s public four-year institutions with three comparison peer
groups that included public universities in Kentucky, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin. The study also included private four-year institutions in Indiana. The researchers
“found no evidence to suggest that performance funding is increasing the number of graduates in
Indiana in comparison with other institutions” (p. 24). Further, the results of the study indicated
PBF institutions became more selective, reducing the overall admissions rates, and fewer lowincome and minority students were admitted (Umbricht et al., 2015).
Pennsylvania’s performance funding was aimed at improving the completion rates among
the state’s universities, and graduation rates were a specific measurement in its allocation
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formula. Hillman et al. (2014) examined the undergraduate completion rates in the state and
compared them to nearby states and similar institutions. They reviewed the 10 years of data
prior to policy implementation and the 10 years that immediately followed. The study showed
“weak evidence” (p. 847) of an increase in completions in Pennsylvania, and “limited evidence”
(p. 850) of outpacing nearby states. Overall, the state’s PBF formula did not positively impact
the stated goal of improving the graduation rates of Pennsylvania colleges and universities
(Hillman et al., 2014).
Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, and Reddy (2016b) focused their study on three
states and their public higher education institutions. Specifically, they selected Indiana, Ohio,
and Tennessee because of their early adoption of PBF 2.0 (Chapter 9, para. 2), and they
examined the institutional responses to PBF, state support for the transition to PBF, and the
impacts on student achievement. Through their mixed methods study, the researchers found that
colleges did make organizational changes as a result of PBF, most notably in developmental
education, counseling, and advising (Chapter 9, Section 5, para. 1). However, Dougherty et al.
(2016) concluded that there was not “a significant positive impact of performance funding in
higher education” (Chapter 9, Section 6, para. 6) on student outcomes in states with PBF
compared to states without PBF.
Two-year colleges meet a critical need of affordability and transferability for students
pursuing higher education, and they serve a strategic economic purpose in workforce
development for their regions. Baime and Baum (2016) observed that the national emphasis on
college completion and economic growth have increased the focus of federal and state policy on
community colleges. Twenty-seven states use some form of PBF for their two-year colleges, and
only seven states that use performance funding for higher education do not include these
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institutions (NCSL, 2015). However, few studies have examined the impact of PBF on the twoyear college sector exclusively. Due to focus on the local area and an open access mission,
community colleges may be especially harmed by state policies that focus on statewide metrics
or university standards that are misaligned with the institution’s operations (Dougherty et al.,
2013; Tandberg et al., 2014). Mullin and Honeyman (2008) examined Florida’s PBF model
from 2005-2008, which increased performance funding from 2% of its allocation to 5% for
community colleges to create incentive for improved performance. Institutional budgets grew as
colleges focused on the measurement criteria, but the study noted that these gains came from
increasing academic offerings and decreasing remedial and adult programs. The researchers
concluded their study by questioning if Florida’s PBF formula caused its colleges to prioritize
financial returns above institutional mission.
North Carolina and Texas are among the states using PBF 2.0 formulas, and Thornton
and Friedel (2016) conducted a qualitative study of the impact of the policies administered by
rural college leaders in both states. Noting the small percentages of the colleges’ budgets
allocated by PBF, the researchers reported that administrators did not make programmatic
decision or organizational changes based on the funding formula. However, the administrators
in the study disclosed that public and board members’ perceptions were impacted by the scores
of the colleges on the performance metrics, especially in comparison to peer institutions
(Thornton & Friedel, 2016).
Hillman et al. (2015) studied the impact of the model adopted by Washington when PBF
was re-introduced in 2007. The state’s board approved a formula that included intermediate and
completion measures, and the researchers specifically sought to determine if the institutional
changes in response to PBF improved graduation rates. The study included Washington’s
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community and technical colleges, as well as comparative institutions in the region that do not
use a performance funding system. Studying a six-year timeframe after the implementation of
PBF, the researchers found little effect on the colleges’ retention rates or associated degree
production (Hillman et al., 2015), but they did observe an increase in short-term certificates.
In the largest study to date of PBF’s impact on community college performance,
Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat (2014) examined completion rates among two-year colleges in
19 states, reviewing data from 1990 through 2010. Findings revealed little evidence that PBF
improved completion rates, and the researchers proposed two possible reasons. First, most of the
performance funding formulas favored full-time students, and only 40% of the community
college students in this study were full-time. Secondly, Tandberg et al. (2014) noted that though
PBF was focused on degree completion: “community colleges serve multiple missions, only one
of which is the delivery of associate’s degree programs” (p. 22). The study by McKinney and
Hagedorn (2015) of Texas community colleges underscored the concern of misalignment of
metrics with the college’s missions, noting that the unique work of community colleges “make
developing PBF policies for this sector especially challenging” (p. 19). Burke and Minassians
(2003) found that state reporting on colleges and universities to higher education agencies and
legislatures for funding did not account for the student demographics, operations, or the mission
of the community college. Since the study by Burke and Minassians (2003), some states, such as
Connecticut and Illinois, have revised their PBF formulas to include those factors (NCSL, 2015).
Research for Action, a non-profit education research group, sponsored reviews of the
PBF models in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee in their 2009, 2010, and 2011 versions
respectively. All three states used PBF for two- and four-year institutions, and the researchers
found mixed results among student outcomes (Callahan, Meehan, & Shaw, 2017). In addition to
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strategic and operations changes to accommodate PBF at the institutions, the authors reported
higher credit hour and degree attainment rates among full-time students in Indiana and
Tennessee. However, graduation rates and credit accumulation did not improve for part-time
students in both states, and the results were mixed for students of color and economically
disadvantaged students (Callahan et al., 2017).
Advocacy for Performance-Based Funding
Despite the challenges and results of PBF to date, calls for accountability and
performance improvement in higher education have not lessened. Nonprofit policy groups such
as Jobs for the Future and Complete College America are actively working with states to
implement and refine performance models that focus on outcomes rather than inputs (Altstadt,
2012; Jones, 2012). In his report, Jones (2012) included the following recommendations that
concur with suggestions in prior research: consideration for underserved populations, increased
PBF-based allocation to promote institutional behavior change, and formula differentiation for
respective institutional missions. Policy briefs for Achieving the Dream and Complete College
America promoted similar strategies and provided guidance for PBF proponents to engage higher
education leaders and the community in crafting effective performance funding policies
(Altstadt, 2012; Jaquette, 2006). In their examination of the strategies used by PBF advocates in
three states, Dougherty et al. (2016) found evidence of support for institutions to develop
capacity for PBF, but this support was usually sponsored or provided by policy groups such as
Complete College American and the result of comprehensive plans by states to help colleges
implement PBF. State legislatures did, however, design the PBF formulas with “phased in”
approaches and funding loss prevention measures to give institutions fiscal stability as they
transitioned to the new models (Dougherty et al., 2016, Shulock, 2011).
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Public Two-Year Colleges in Texas
Texas’ public two-year colleges include two specific types of institutions: standard
community colleges and Texas State Technical College (TSTC). They are frequently linked by
legislation, policy, and are coordinated by the state’s governing agency for colleges and
universities, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB). Collectively, these
institutions enrolled 712,468 students and awarded more than 99,000 degrees in 2014 (THECB,
2016c). The state’s 50 community colleges are established by the legislature and assigned
specific service areas by the THECB. Voters within the service areas determine the taxing
district for each community college and elect a governing board, which establishes local district
tuition rates, local policy, and provides institutional oversight.
Texas State Technical College was established by Governor John Connally in 1965 as the
two-year branch of Texas A&M, and it became a separate state agency with its own appointed
governing board in 1969 (TSTC, 2016). In 2016, the system of four independent colleges
merged into a single college with ten campuses. TSTC has a statewide mission rather than
specific service areas, and because the college receives no local taxes, state appropriations and
student tuition comprises the majority of its budget.
Funding Methodology and Trends
State funding for public higher education in Texas is determined during each legislative
session, and most of the funds are allocated by various funding formulas, depending on the type
of institution and the use of funds (THECB, 2016a). State law requires the biennial
appropriation to “supplement local funds for the proper support, maintenance, operation, and
improvement” of public community colleges (Texas Education Code, 2017, § 130.003a). From
1973 to 2013, state funding for community colleges and TSTC was determined by contact hours,
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an enrollment-based methodology using factors of cost of delivery, number of students enrolled,
and number of class hours per student in courses. Institutions reported all expenses of instruction
by course types, excluding facilities, to the THECB. The Coordinating Board organized the
expenditure data into 26 program areas in accordance with the Department of Education’s
Classification of Instructional Programs to determine the average cost for each course type, also
known as the contact hour funding rate (Legislative Budget Board [LBB], 2013). The THECB
then recommended an allocation amount for each institution, based on a percentage of the
funding rates for its contact hour types, to the state legislature. Because the expenditure data
included costs that colleges recovered through other means, such as tax revenue and student
tuition, the contact hour funding rate recommended by the THECB did not equal 100% of the
reported expenses (LBB, 2016). State lawmakers considered the THECB recommendation in
light of available state revenue and competing governmental priorities, and the legislature
determined the final appropriation for each institution. Contact hour-based funding for
community colleges and TSTC grew from $784.4 million in 2001 to $929.9 million in 2013, an
increase of 18.4%, but the number of contact hours taught by public two-year colleges grew by
more than 60% during the same time (THECB, 2016b).
Performance-Based Funding Formulas in Texas Two-Year Colleges
In their June, 2010 funding formula report to the legislature, the THECB rejected the
suggestion of a PBF model that included incentives and included a recommendation to delay the
start of funding based on performance metrics until the 2013 academic year, noting “This will
allow institutions an opportunity to adjust their policies and practices accordingly” (THECB,
2011, p. 11). Lawmakers followed this recommendation, and subsequently passed H.B. 9 (2011)
which amended earlier legislation to include consideration for “critical fields” (p. 3), such as
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engineering, computer science, and nursing, and for at-risk populations. In 2013, the 83rd Texas
Legislature formally adopted two performance-based funding models, one for the state’s 50
community colleges and a distinct formula for TSTC. The Texas community college PBF
formula, also referred to as the Success Points model, incorporated intermediate and completion
metrics to calculate institutional performance. Colleges earn points for students’ achievements
of developmental coursework, first-level college courses, and semester credit hour (SCH)
milestones, as well as other metrics such as graduation or transfer to a four-year university.
Table 1 presents a list of completion metrics and their respective point values.
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Table 1
Texas Community College Success Points Model Student Completion Metrics and Point Values
Metric
Developmental education in mathematics

Points
1.0

Developmental education in reading

0.5

Developmental education in writing

0.5

First college-level mathematics course with grade of C or better

1.0

First college-level course designated as reading-intensive with grade of C or better

0.5

First college-level course designated as writing-intensive with grade of C or better

0.5

First 15 SCH at the institution

1.0

First 30 SCH at the institution

1.0

Transfer to general academic institution after completing at least 15 SCH at the
institution

2.0

Associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, or certificate recognized for this purpose by the
THECB in a field other than science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM)
or allied health

2.0

Associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, or certificate recognized for this purpose by the
2.25
THECB in a STEM or allied health field
Legislative Budget Board. (2016). Financing public higher education in Texas. Legislative
Primer Report – ID: 3148. Austin, TX: Legislative Budget Board Staff.
The model, which began in 2014 fiscal year, accounts for 10% of the state funding given
to community colleges, and it is calculated each fiscal year, with the results factored into the
biennial legislative appropriations bill. The balance of community college funding is the
combination of the contact hour formula and $1 million for “core operations to help cover basic
operating costs, regardless of the district’s geographic location or institutional size” (LBB,
2016). The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board developed the model in partnership
with community college leaders from around the state and worked with the Texas Association of
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Community Colleges to make minor revisions for the 2016-2017 biennium (D. Hudson, personal
communication, June 9, 2014).
One advantage was the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board’s (THECB)
inclusion of multiple measures, noting “educational achievement includes more than just
traditional, terminal accomplishments” (THECB, 2015b, p. 1). Further, the information used to
calculate the formula is among the data already compiled and submitted by institutions, and no
additional reporting is necessary (THECB, 2015b).
The Success Points model does not include any factors for at-risk populations, and
McKinney and Hagedorn (2015) calculated that colleges benefit most from the formula with
high performing students and least from older students and GED completers. They noted that the
current Success Points model may incentivize institutions to target the students most likely to
succeed because those students generate more funding for the colleges. Therefore, an
unintended consequence of PBF may be fewer services and less recruiting for lower performing
students, harming Texas’ diverse community college students (McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015).
Performance-Based Funding at Texas State Technical College
In cooperation with TSTC, the THECB and the Comptroller’s Office, the 81st Texas
Legislature instructed the THECB in 2009 to evaluate the merits of a PBF formula specifically
for the technical college system, with special consideration of the institution’s unique mission in
Texas (S.B. 1, 2009, p. III-62). From the outset, the PBF model for TSTC addressed key
recommendations made by researchers and policy advocates: collaborative design by college
leaders and policy makers, sufficient time for planning and implementation, significant funding,
and alignment with the institutional mission (Burke & Modarresi, 2000; Kadlec & Shelton, 2015;
Miao, 2012; Shin, 2010; Tandberg et al., 2014). TSTC is charged specifically with contributing
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“to the educational and economic development of the State of Texas by offering occupationally
oriented programs with supporting academic course work, emphasizing highly specialized
advanced and emerging technical and vocational areas for certificates or associate degrees”
(Texas Education Code, 2017, §135.01b). Following a favorable report from the THECB, the
82nd Texas Legislature instructed the THECB to develop a “value-added” formula that, in direct
contrast to the prior, enrollment-based formula, “shall reward job placement and graduate
earnings projections, not time in training or contact hours” (H.B. 1, 2011, p. III-54).
The THECB collaborated with TSTC staff, the LBB, and the Ray Marshall Center for the
Study of Human Resources at the University of Texas to develop a performance-based funding
formula for TSTC (THECB, 2013). The 83rd Texas Legislature established the Returned Value
Funding Model for TSTC, basing its allocation on the “direct and indirect state tax revenues
generated because of the education provided to students by the TSTCs” (S.B. 1, 2013, p. III216). The bill further detailed the model as follows:
1. Cohorts comprised of graduates, transfers, and leavers who did not enroll at another
Texas higher education institution after two years, earning at least nine SCH from
2006 and 2007.
2. Cohorts were matched with Unemployment Insurance wage data to determine
students’ wages for five years after leaving TSTC.
3. Direct value-add is “the incremental state tax revenue attributable to former TSTC
students' jobs, based on the difference between former TSTC students' annual wages
and a base wage representing a full-time employee earning minimum wage (7 percent
of the wage delta)” (p. III-216).

42
4. Indirect value-add is “the direct value-added multiplied by 1.5, an economic
multiplier derived from a U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis study” (p. III-216).
5. The direct and indirect value-adds of a five-year period were combined, then reduced
by a given percentage to establish TSTC’s PBF formula.
In its report to the 84th Texas Legislature, TSTC (2015, p. 2) presented a simplified
version of the PBF formula in the following way:
1. [Average salaries earned by TSTC students] less [minimum wage earnings] = average
value added by TSTC
2. [Average value added by TSTC] times [number of students placed in jobs] =
economic benefit to Texas
3. [Economic benefit to Texas] less [the legislative discount] = TSTC’s formula
funding.
Though early designs of the formula proposed that TSTC receive 50% of the direct and
indirect value-adds, the Returned Value Funding Model was initially capped to match what the
prior, contact-hour-based formula would have recommended for TSTC, ensuring the formula
would demonstrate consistency with previous funding levels (G. Hendricks, personal
communication, October 16, 2016). The legislature appropriated $90 million to TSTC for 20142015, 32.6% of the sum of the direct and indirect value-adds (S.B. 1, 2013), and for the 20162017 biennium, the 84th Texas Legislature appropriated 35.5% of the value added to TSTC, a
total of $94 million (H.B. 1, 2015).
Summary
PBF policies will continue to evolve as stakeholders seek more transparency in the use of
public funds for higher education, and the current trends of PBF place greater emphasis on
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student success. Legislatures have moved away from providing bonus or extra money to public
institutions to incentivize student achievement, and PBF 2.0 formulas are placing greater burden
on institutions to demonstrate attainment of success measures to receive full funding. Though
the measures were not consistent from state to state, 95% of states using or considering PBF
included retention, graduation, or placement/transfer as performance metrics tied to public
funding (NCSL, 2015). In contrast to this trend and its underlying theoretical perspectives, there
is little evidence that PBF states improve student outcomes at a greater rate than non-PBF states.
Hillman (2016), reviewing a dozen quantitative studies on PBF, observed, “the weight of
evidence suggests states using performance-based funding do not out-perform other states” (p.
6).
The Returned Value PBF model at TSTC incorporated many of the recommendations
from previous research on performance funding, and the current study fills the gap in existing
literature by examining the impact of PBF at the institution and program level. The results from
the study may be used to further refine TSTC’s funding design, and they establish a baseline of
performance among TSTC’s academic divisions and a methodology for future measurement.
Chapter Three presents the methodology used in this study to assess the impact of the Returned
Value Funding model on TSTC graduation rates.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The prior research on the impact of PBF on two-year college student graduation rates
compared states with performance-based funding policies to states without PBF (Tandberg et al.,
2014). In his review of applicable studies, Hillman (2016) reported no research that evaluated
the impact on graduation rates at specific institutions, and no empirical research on PBF at
individual colleges. Thus, the current study addressed a gap in the existing literature by
examining the change in graduation rate at a single institution before and after the PBF formula
was implemented. This study further evaluated the impact at the program level by comparing
completion rates among academic divisions. This chapter reviews the research purpose and
questions, describes the context and participants, explains the process for preparing the sample,
and provides an overview of the statistical methods to be used. The chapter concludes with
information on the proposed data analysis and limitations.
The research methodology for this study was based on the following research questions:
1. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in the overall graduation rate
at Texas State Technical College after the implementation of the Returned Value Fund
Model when compared to the graduation rate prior to the implementation of the
performance-based funding?
2. To what extent is there a statistically significantly difference in graduation rate by
academic divisions after the implementation of the Returned Value Funding Model when
compared to the graduation rate prior to performance-based funding?
The null hypothesis for this study proposed no statistically significant difference between
graduation rates before the implementation of PBF compared to the graduation rates after 2013
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when PBF was implemented. Where the proportion of pre-PBF graduates is represented by p1
and the proportion of post-PBF graduates is represented by p2, the null hypothesis is stated as
Ho : p1 = p2 . The study evaluated any statistical difference between the rates, not only any
increase; therefore, the alternative hypothesis is expressed as HA : p1 ≠ p2 .
To answer the research questions, the study employed two research designs: a z test for
the difference between proportions and an interrupted time series analysis. The Returned Value
Funding Model applied to all TSTC students in this study’s population since its implementation
in 2013; therefore, random assignment to treatment and control groups was not possible.
However, the matching process used for the z test mimicked random assignment, and the prePBF and post-PBF cohorts formed comparison groups appropriate for the quasi-experimental
design. The quantitative design of the analysis was appropriate to evaluate the statistical
significance of any difference between the pre-PBF and post-PBF samples.
Context
TSTC is a multi-campus institution in Texas, with ten permanent locations across the
state. Prior to the implementation of the Returned Value Funding Model, TSTC’s legislative
appropriation was based on contact hours, an enrollment-based calculation of student
participation where one student in one class for one hour equals one contact hour. The contact
hours were then multiplied by average costs of delivery for each type of course provided by all
two-year colleges in Texas to calculate the recommended appropriation. The contact hour
formula effectively funded TSTC for the amount of time students spent in its courses, not on the
economic impact of its graduates. Upon its approval of the Returned Value Funding Model, the
83rd Texas Legislature separated TSTC’s PBF formula from the state’s community colleges and
established a unique public funding mechanism for higher education. TSTC presented an
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opportunity to study the impact of PBF on graduation rates because the formula addressed key
recommendations of previous PBF research: collaboration with the college’s leadership, focus on
the institutional mission, and a high percentage of its budget determined by performance
funding. The Texas legislature approved the formula with the intent of improving TSTC’s
completion rates (THECB, 2013).
Research Design
To calculate the statistical significance of the Returned Value Funding Model’s impact on
TSTC graduation rates, the independent variable in this study was the PBF formula for TSTC as
enacted by the state legislature in 2013 and implemented by the THECB. The dependent
variable was the student completion rates, a stated goal in the legislation that recommended the
formula change (THECB, 2013). Previous research on PBF at two-year institutions focused on
academic instead of workforce programs and did not include certificate programs (Tandberg et
al., 2014). However, in this study, THECB-recognized workforce Level 1 (CERT1) and Level 2
(CERT2) certificates were included in the dependent variable calculations, as they were defined
educational objectives focused on a single technical specialty (THECB, 2016d), and the
certificates were complementary to the college’s AAS degrees. Because the Returned Value
Funding Model measured the economic impact of the college’s graduates in the Texas
workforce, TSTC’s CERT1, CERT2, and AAS programs were collectively considered when
calculating the dependent variable of graduation rates in this study. TSTC collects and retains
enrollment and completion data for all students, as well as key demographic information, and the
institution’s data were used in this study.
As a comparison between graduation rates before the implementation of PBF and after
PBF, the broadest population from which the sample was drawn includes all students enrolled at
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TSTC since it began in 1965. However, this population was first narrowed by the exclusion of
students before 2000, when TSTC moved from a quarter system to a traditional collegiate
semester. Though the demographic characteristics of pre-2000 students were consistent with
later students, individuals enrolled prior to 2000 followed a significantly different academic
calendar and did not begin their programs in the same cohort structure as post-2000 students.
Therefore, they were excluded from this study.
The data used in the first research design focused on three semester periods: two before
implementation and one following the authorization of PBF by the state legislature. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the enrollment at TSTC remained relatively steady between 2000 and
2015, except for a sharp increase from 2008 through 2011.
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Figure 2. Annual fall enrollment headcount at TSTC from 2000-2015.
To evaluate the difference in graduation rates before the implementation of PBF, a
sample of students was taken before the temporary increase and during the increase. The sample
for this design only included individuals at TSTC who enrolled as fully matriculated students for
the first time in the Fall 2005 semester, the Fall 2009 semester, and the Fall 2013 semester.
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Students from 2005 were selected because the 150% completion date for this cohort, a standard
metric used by the NCES (2016), ended prior to the expansion of year-round Pell Grant
authorized by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (2008). Students enrolled for the
first time in the Fall 2009 semester had the benefit of access to a larger Pell Grant and additional
funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009). To be included as
graduates in the calculation of the graduation rate, the sampled students who enrolled in the Fall
semesters of 2005, 2009, or 2013 must have completed their degree or certificate in 150% of the
published (TSTC Catalog) expected time to graduation for an AAS degree.
Dual credit students were not included in the Returned Value Funding Model during the
time of this study, and TSTC received no state funding for their outcomes. Because the
institution had no financial incentive to improve the graduation rates for this group of students,
no high school students who received dual credit from TSTC were included in the population of
this study.
To evaluate the impact of PBF on student graduation rates at TSTC, the first statistical
design used a paired, or matched, sampling method to determine the final samples that were
statistically evaluated. Matched sample research designs pair samples from one population with
corresponding samples from a different population based on one or more variables to create a
direct counterpart (Fraenkel, Wallen, & Hyun, 1993). By matching covariates between the
selected samples, the method allows researchers to examine the dependent variable under
investigation and compare the effects of an intervention in cases when random assignment to
control and treatment groups is not possible (Stuart, 2010). Stuart and Rubin (2008) observed
that matching methods “attempt to replicate, as closely as possible, the ideal of randomized
experiments when using observational data” (p. 155). Matched sample designs are used
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frequently in medical and social science research to evaluate causal inference in observational
data (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007; King & Nielsen, 2016; Morgan & Harding, 2005).
To enhance the accuracy of the matching process, the design employed a full or exact
matching process that directly linked the pre- and post-sample groups in a one-to-one
comparison. In the exact matching method, the researcher pairs each treatment sample with a
corresponding control sample with the same values on the selected covariates (Randolph, Falbe,
Manuel, & Balloun, 2014). This full matching minimizes variance as effectively as alternative
control and treatment group designs for observational studies, and it is an improvement over
propensity scoring matching methods (Godfrey, 2016; Hansen, 2004; King & Nielsen, 2016).
To determine the selected covariates, this first design of this study drew upon prior
research on TSTC students. Hendricks (2000) conducted a longitudinal, statewide study of
TSTC students to determine variables most related to student graduation and found the following
factors were most significant:
1. full- or part-time student status,
2. gender,
3. academically disadvantaged,
4. economically disadvantaged, and
5. program major.
Items one through four are binary data collected by TSTC for each student upon enrollment in
the institution, and academic division was determined by the student’s choice of program major.
The programs were aligned into academic divisions of similar disciplines and presented in
Appendix A.
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The second statistical test in this study was an interrupted time series design. Frequently
used in research on the impact of public policy, interrupted time series (ITS) designs compare
changes in the baseline trend of pre-intervention groups with post-intervention groups over a
period of time when random, controlled experiments are not possible or feasible (Biglan, Ary, &
Wagenaar, 2000; Glass, 1997). This method does not require matching cohorts, but rather it
examines statistical changes in level and trends of longitudinal data (Bloom, 2016; McDowall,
1980), and the interrupted time series method has been used to study the impact of PBF in
Indiana and Tennessee (Callahan, Meehan, Shaw, Slaughter, Kim, Hunter, Lin, & Wainstein,
2017a; Callahan et al., 2017b). Therefore, the data sample for this design was TSTC students
who enrolled in the Fall 2005 semester through the Summer 2017 semester graduates.
Consistent with the current study’s delimitations, this sample included only CERT1, CERT2, and
AAS graduates; dual credit students were excluded.
Data Collection
Following approval by the Human Subjects Review Committee of the Darden College of
Education at Old Dominion University and the Institutional Review Board at TSTC, the request
for data was submitted to the TSTC Business Analytics and Reporting department. This study
examined existing data and records that are publicly available as directory information or were
recorded in such a manner that the subjects cannot be identified directly or indirectly. The data
request included information on new student cohorts from the Fall semesters of 2005, 2009, and
2013, excluding individuals enrolled as dual credit students, and including student graduation
date. These data were used for the first statistical design. Additionally, data were collected on
CERT1, CERT2, and AAS graduates by program from the Fall 2005 through the Summer 2017
semester for use in the second statistical test. The requested data were exported from TSTC’s
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student information system, also known as “‘Colleague”, in comma-separated values formats,
such as Microsoft Excel. For all data, personally identifiable information, such as name, address,
and student identification number, were removed, and where necessary, a sequential, anonymous
record numbers was assigned to each student record. No identifiable information will be
published as a part of this study.
The data of each year’s cohort were sorted by enrollment status, gender, academic, and
economic disadvantage, and the students were categorized by academic division based on the
student’s last declared major. Students in the Fall 2005 cohort were then matched by the
predetermined demographic categories with students in the Fall 2013 cohort, and the Fall 2009
students were matched to corresponding Fall 2013 students. The pairings were made without
consideration of the student’s graduation status, and the two matched sets were the final samples
used for statistical evaluation in the first statistical test in the current study. For the interrupted
time series, the graduation rates from the Fall 2005 through Summer 2017 semesters were
calculated separately for each term for the entire institution and for each academic division.
Statistical Tests
The first evaluation of the data sets examined the statistical difference between the
proportions of sample students who graduated before PBF and the matched students who started
after PBF in 2013. The null hypothesis stated there is no statistically significant difference
between the samples, or H0: p1 – p2 = 0, and a two-tailed z test for proportions was used to
calculate the test statistic. Where n1 and n2 are the number of matched students in the sample
before and after PBF, and G1 and G2 were the graduates in the samples, the overall sample
proportion was:
𝑝=

𝐺%
𝐺(
+
𝑛%
𝑛(
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Assuming a normal distribution, the test statistic was calculated using the standard formula as
follows:
𝑧 =

𝑝% − 𝑝( − 0
𝑝 1−𝑝

1
1
+
𝑛% 𝑛(

The second statistical evaluation was an interrupted time series analysis. Sommers, Zhu,
Jacob, and Bloom (2013) observed the ITS method was more rigorous than other comparative
analysis methods because “it implicitly controls for the differences between the treatment and
comparison group with respect to their baseline outcome levels and growth” (p. 3).
Furthermore, ITS was an appropriate method for the data in the current study because of the long
baseline period of TSTC graduation rates evaluated, and the implementation of PBF in 2013
provided a clear point in time from which to evaluate pre- and post-intervention.
The ITS design in this study examined the broad impact of PBF on the TSTC student
population from the Fall 2005 semester through the Summer 2017 term. Rather than using the
matched samples employed in the z test, the ITS used a broader sample of all TSTC students
during that time. It also benefitted this study by providing a visual display of changes, if any, in
the level or trends of graduation rates for the institution and each academic division. The null
hypothesis for this study states that there is no difference in the graduation rates at TSTC overall
and by academic divisions. Therefore, the factors considered by the ITS analysis were the slope
or trend of graduation rates, and the ITS also identified any changes in the levels of graduation
rates after the implementation of PBF.
To conduct the ITS, the data were separated by semester, beginning with students who
started at TSTC in Fall 2005 and continuing through Summer 2017 graduates, and all CERT1,
CERT2, and AAS graduates were included in the analysis. The data were compiled in a comma-
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separated values spreadsheet with columns for semester, graduation rate, time increment, PBF
implementation, and trend post-implementation. Using RStudio version 1.0.143 and R version
3.4.0 for Mac OS X, the statistical tests were run for a preliminary ordinary least squares
regression model to assess for autocorrelation, and appropriate statistical tests were conducted to
evaluate positive or negative correlation. The RStudio code is shown in Appendix B. The
following segmented regression model was used:
Yt = b0 + b1 ´ timet + b2 ´ levelt + b3 ´ trendt + et
where Y represented the outcome, b0 represented the baseline level at the beginning of the study,

b1 was pre-intervention trend, b2 was the level change following PBF, b3 represented the postintervention trend, and et estimated the error over time (Bloom, 1999; Somers et al., 2013;
Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, Ross-Degnan, 2002).
The final regression analysis results were plotted to show the trend and levels of TSTC
graduation rates prior to the implementation of PBF, the level immediately afterward, and the
trend after 2013. In addition to the statistical tables for each coefficient, a graph of the ITS
analyses were prepared for TSTC as a whole and for each academic division, and an extension of
the pre-intervention trend line beyond the implementation of PBF was included in each graph for
comparison.
Data Analysis
The data from the two statistical tests provided a broad view of the impact of TSTC’s
PBF model. The z test for proportions examined graduation rates for specific matched sample
cohorts at TSTC in 2005, 2009, and 2013. For this test, the significance level (a) was set at
0.05; therefore, a z statistic greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 was considered statistically
significant. The z statistic was computed for the entire 2005 to 2013 and 2009 to 2013
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comparison samples, as well as for each academic division in the sample sets. The ITS analysis
was used to calculate the statistical significance of changes in graduation trends after PBF for all
students who began at TSTC from Fall 2005 through Summer 2017 graduates, with a = 0.05.
The ITS analyses were also conducted for each academic division.
Limitations
The current study does have limitations. First, it is limited by generalizability. Because
each state was using a different PBF formula at the time of this research, the study has limited
applicability outside of Texas. Further, the funding formula for TSTC was distinct from the
other two-year colleges in the state. The proposed study did not have a control group within the
same population or a comparison group for evaluation. While the matched sample design may
improve internal validity, the study was not a true, randomized experiment. Graduation rates are
also affected by multiple factors of institutional quality, such as faculty, facilities, and curricula,
and the current study did not evaluate these topics. Similarly, TSTC’s total budget is affected by
numerous elements, including tuition rates, enrollment, and special line-item funding through
legislation. This study only considered the Returned Value Funding model as the independent
variable. Finally, public policy implementation is an ongoing process that may take several years
to realize, and this study did not consider any ongoing institutional changes motivated by the
PBF formula that may impact graduation rates.
Summary
The implementation of the Returned Value Funding model at TSTC provided an
opportunity to study the impact of PBF on graduation rates, and the current study adds to the
existing literature by examining a single institution and its academic programs rather than an
entire state. The methodology employed two statistical tests to provide a more comprehensive
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analysis of graduation rates before and after PBF, and to improve the validity of the study
overall. The z test for proportions used matched sample data from the Fall 2005, 2009, and 2013
semesters, and the interrupted time series design included all CERT1, CERT2, and AAS
graduates from 2005 to 2017. These two complimentary methods allowed the researcher to
examine the statistical significance of the impact of TSTC’s PBF model on student graduation
rates.
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Chapter 4
Results
As policymakers seek to improve accountability among colleges and universities,
performance-based funding (PBF) may be used to link fiscal appropriations for public
institutions to intermediate or outcome measures such as retention or graduation rates. Early
studies proposed improvements to states’ PBF formulas (Cavanaugh & Garland, 2012; Shin,
2010), and the purpose of this study was to examine the impact of a funding methodology that
included some of the recommended changes on graduation rates at Texas State Technical
College (TSTC). The study incorporated two statistical tests to evaluate changes in graduation
rates after the implementation of PBF at TSTC in 2013. The first test used a matching method to
compare students who began at TSTC in the Fall semesters of 2005 and 2009 to students with
similar demographic characteristics who began in Fall 2013. The second test was an interrupted
time series (ITS) analysis of the graduation rates and trends for all students from Fall 2005
through Summer 2017 graduates. These methods provided snapshot and longitudinal views of
the impact of PBF on the graduation rates at TSTC. The study was guided by the following
research questions:
1. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in the overall graduation rate
at Texas State Technical College after the implementation of the Returned Value Fund
Model when compared to the graduation rate prior to the implementation of the
performance-based funding?
2. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in graduation rate by
academic divisions after the implementation of the Returned Value Funding Model when
compared to the graduation rate prior to performance-based funding?
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The null hypothesis for this study proposed that there was no statistically significant difference
between graduation rates before and after the implementation of the funding formula change.
Graduation Rates of Matched Samples Before and After PBF
To prepare the data for the z test for proportions, students from each semester were
matched by the following five demographic factors identified by Hendricks (2000) and
categorized by academic division as listed in Appendix A:
1. full- or part-time student status,
2. gender,
3. academically disadvantaged,
4. economically disadvantaged, and
5. program major.
For the comparison group of Fall 2005 to Fall 2013, a total population of 6,275 students pursued
CERT1, CERT2, or AAS awards, and 1,379 final matches were made based on the five
demographic factors. The largest number of matches was in the Computer and Information
Systems division (346), followed by Transportation (316), Engineering and Electronics (239),
and Industrial and Manufacturing (191). Allied Health and Business and Professions had 129
and 123 matches respectively, and Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources had 35 set of
matched students. Table 2 presents the number of matches for each division and the final
sample, as well as the number and percentage of graduates in each year. To determine
significance between the samples, the z statistic for proportions was calculated for each rate set,
and the corresponding p value was determined. Table 3 repeats the graduation rates for each
division in the comparison semesters and displays the results of the z test and each p value for
each comparison.
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Of the 1,379 matched students who started in Fall 2005, 457 students graduated, a
completion rate of 33.14%. The number of graduates for the 2013 students matched to the 2005
cohort dropped by 40 to 417, a decrease of 2.90%. This change was not statistically significant
at the p < 0.05 level.
Only two divisions from the Fall 2005 to Fall 2013 comparison increased graduation
rates: Allied Health and Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources. The Allied Health
division increased graduation rates from 2005 to 2013, improving by 8.53%, a difference of 11
graduates, and Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources had one more graduate among the
2013 matches than the 2005 sample. The Business and Professions, Engineering and
Electronics, Industrial and Manufacturing, and Transportation divisions all decreased in
graduation rates of matched students from 2005 to 2013, but the declines in these areas were not
statistically significant. The Computer and Information Systems division sample, which
contained that largest number of matched students (346), did have a statistically significant drop
in graduation rates from 25.43% in Fall 2005 to 17.05% in Fall 2013, a decrease of 8.38%. This
change in graduation rate after the implementation rate supported the alternative hypothesis for
research question 2.
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Table 2
Student Matches From 2005 to 2013 for Each Academic Division
Division

Total
2005
Matches Matched
Graduates

2013
Matched
Graduates

37

2005
Matched
Graduation
Rate
28.68%

48

2013
Net
Matched
Change
Graduation
Rate
37.21%
8.53%

Allied Health

129

Business and
Professions

123

32

26.02%

28

22.76%

-3.26%

Computer and
Information Systems

346

88

25.43%

59

17.05%

-8.38%

Engineering and
Electronics

239

85

35.56%

83

34.73%

-0.83%

Environmental,
Safety, and Natural
Resources

35

11

31.43%

12

34.29%

2.86%

Industrial and
Manufacturing

191

83

43.46%

72

37.70%

-5.76%

Transportation

316

121

38.29%

115

36.39%

-1.90%

Total

1,379

457

33.14%

417

30.24%

-2.90%
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Table 3
Graduation Percentages, z Statistic, and p Value for 2005 to 2013 for Each Academic Division
Division

2013 Matched
z Statistic
Graduation Rate
37.21%
1.457

p Value

Allied Health

2005 Matched
Graduation Rate
28.68%

Business and Professions

26.02%

22.76%

-0.5939

0.5552

Computer and
Information Systems

25.43%

17.05%

-2.6852

0.0069

Engineering and
Electronics

35.56%

34.73%

-0.1916

0.8493

Environmental, Safety,
and Natural Resources

31.43%

34.29%

0.2545

0.8026

Industrial and
Manufacturing

43.46%

37.70%

-1.1462

0.2501

Transportation

38.29%

36.39%

-0.4934

0.6241

Total

33.14%

30.24%

-1.6370

0.1010

0.1443

From a population of 8,252 students in Fall 2009 and Fall 2013, a total of 1,548 matched
sets were established using the demographic factors identified by Hendricks (2000). Of these
pairs, 475 of the 2009 cohort graduated, and 461 of the 2013 cohort completed, a decrease of
0.90% after the implementation of PBF. This change in graduation rate from pre-PBF to postPBF for all students in the matched sample was not significant at the p < 0.05 level and
supported the null hypothesis for research question 1.
Table 4 presents the number of matches for each division and the total sample, as well as
the number and percentage of graduates in each year. Table 5 repeats the graduation rates for
each division in the Fall 2009 and Fall 2013 matched sets and displays the results of the z test
and each p value for each comparison. In this series, the Engineering and Electronics division
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had the most matched pairs (378), followed by Computer and Information Systems (339),
Transportation (268), and Industrial and Manufacturing (229). Business and Professions had 153
sets, Allied Health had 140, and Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources had just 41.
Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources had the largest percentage change in graduation
rates from 2009 to 2013 (7.32%), but because of the low number of matches, this was achieved
with only three additional graduates. The number of matched graduates per division fluctuated
slightly between comparison years, and no division increased or decreased more than 10 matched
graduates after the implementation of PBF in 2013. None of the changes in graduation rates of
the matched students between Fall 2009 and Fall 2013 were statistically significant at the
institution level or the division level, supporting the null hypotheses for research questions 1 and
2.
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Table 4
Student Matches From 2009 to 2013 for Each Academic Division
Division

Total
Matches
140

2009
2009
Matched
Matched
Graduates Graduation
Rate
53
37.86%

2013
2013
Net
Matched Matched
Change
Graduates Graduation
Rate
47
33.57%
-4.29%

Allied Health
Business and
Professions

153

24

15.69%

27

17.65%

1.69%

Computer and
Information
Systems

339

59

17.40%

50

14.75%

-2.65%

Engineering and
Electronics

378

148

39.15%

143

37.83%

-1.32%

Environmental,
Safety, and
Natural Resources

41

12

29.27%

15

36.59%

7.32%

Industrial and
Manufacturing

229

100

43.67%

90

39.30%

-4.37%

Transportation

268

79

29.48%

89

33.21%

3.73%

Total

1,548

475

30.68%

461

29.78%

-0.90%
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Table 5
Graduation Percentages, z Statistic, and p Value for 2005 to 2013 for Each Academic Division
Division

2013 Matched
Graduation Rate
33.57%

z Statistic

p Value

Allied Health

2009 Matched
Graduation Rate
37.86%

-0.7483

0.4533

Business and Professions

15.69%

17.65%

0.4602

0.6455

Computer and
Information Systems

17.40%

14.75%

-0.9410

0.3472

Engineering and
Electronics

39.15%

37.83%

-0.3737

0.7114

Environmental, Safety,
and Natural Resources

29.27%

36.59%

0.7050

0.4839

Industrial and
Manufacturing

43.67%

39.30%

-0.9484

0.3421

Transportation

29.48%

33.21%

0.9311

0.3524

Total

30.68%

29.78%

-0.5479

0.5823

The matched samples from Fall 2005 to Fall 2013 and Fall 2009 to Fall 2013 provided
comparison points before and after the implementation of PBF for students with similar
demographic characteristics. While some academic divisions improved graduation rates and
others decreased, both institutional samples showed declines in overall completion. Only the
Fall 2005 to Fall 2013 comparison of matched students in the Computer and Information
Systems indicated a statistically significant change in graduation rates, with a decrease of 8.38%.
Graduation Rates of All Students Before and After PBF
The second analysis of graduation rates at TSTC was an interrupted time series (ITS),
which included students who started at TSTC from the Fall 2005 semester through the Spring
2016 semester, a total of 44,567 individuals. This population included students pursuing
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Associate of Applied Science degrees, Level 1 Certificates, or Level 2 Certificates, but the study
excluded high school students enrolled for dual credit. Figures 3 through 10 illustrate the
graduation rates for cohorts from each semester in the study for the institution as a whole and by
academic division, and a dashed, vertical line before Fall 2013 indicates the implementation of
PBF at TSTC. As presented in Figure 3, the institutional graduation rates at TSTC during the
time studied stayed relatively steady, with a noticeable drop in Summer 2011 and slight increase
thereafter.

Figure 3. Graduation rates by semester for all divisions at TSTC.
The Allied Health division graduation rates declined from a peak of 56.30% for students
who began in Summer 2006 to a low of 18.18% for Summer 2011 students. The graduation rate
improved for the Fall 2011 cohort and averaged about 40% thereafter. The division’s cohort
with the highest graduation rate in this study was Summer 2015 students, when 50 of 84 students
who began that term completed (59.52%). There were 7,207 Allied Health students in the
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sample from Fall 2005 through Spring 2016, or 16.17% of the total, and the graduation rates for
the division is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Graduation rates by semester for Allied Health.
The Business and Professions division had 3,654 students in the sample, and the
graduation rates in the division declined steadily from Fall 2005 to less than 10% for students
who began in Fall 2008. From 2009 through end of this study, the rates fluctuated between
1.92% for the Summer 2011 cohort, when only one of 52 students graduated, to a high of
38.71% of the 78 students in the Spring 2012 cohort. Figure 5 presents the graduation rates for
the Business and Professions division.
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Figure 5. Graduation rates by semester for Business and Professions.
The average graduation rate for the Computer and Information Systems division
remained steady at approximately 15% through the current study, with variations from 8.30% for
the Fall 2011 cohort to 21.70% for students who began in Spring 2013. The rates are displayed
in Figure 6. Like other divisions in this study, Computer and Information Systems students who
started in Summer 2011 were least likely to graduate among the division’s cohorts from Fall
2005 through Spring 2016, completing at a rate of only 5.61%. The Computer and Information
System division had 9,262 individuals in the sample, the most of any division in this study.

67

Figure 6. Graduation rates by semester for Computer and Information Systems.
The Engineering and Electronics division included 7,763 students in the sample, and its
graduation rates, presented in Figure 7, generally increased over the span of the current study.
Students in this division who began from Fall 2005 through Fall 2007 completed at an average
rate of 24%. The average improved to at least 32% for cohorts from Fall 2010 through Fall 2012
and remained at that level after the implementation of PBF, with the exception of a drop to
24.58% for the Spring 2015 cohort.
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Figure 7. Graduation rates by semester for Engineering and Electronics.
The Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources division was the smallest group in the
sample with 1,618 students or 3.6% of the total. The graduation rates for the division were stable
for students who began in Fall 2005 through Fall 2007, averaging 22%, but the rates varied
through the balance of the study, ranging from a peak of 50% for the Summer 2012 cohort to no
graduates from the Summer 2015 cohort. The graduation rates for the Environmental, Safety,
and Natural Resources are presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Graduation rates by semester for Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources.
The Industrial and Manufacturing division had 6,839 students in the sample, which was
15.3% of the total sample, and the graduation rates are shown in Figure 9. Students who began
in Summer 2006 completed at a rate of 54.39%, but the average rate declined over time, with the
graduation rates below 30% for each of the five cohorts from Spring 2011 through Summer
2012. The graduation rates improved for students who began in the three semesters prior to the
implementation of PBF, and remained above 35% following the Fall 2013, with the exception of
a drop to 30.16% for the Summer 2015 cohort.
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Figure 9. Graduation rates by semester for Industrial and Manufacturing.
The graduation rates for the Transportation division increased steadily in the sample, with
small variations between semesters. Students who began in Fall 2005 through Spring 2008
completed at an average of 21.98%, and by the Summer 2013 cohort, the graduation rate
exceeded 38%. The improvement in graduation rates continued after the implementation of the
Returned Value Funding model, and all three cohorts that began in 2015 had completion rates of
at least 40%. The sample of Transportation division students in this study included 8,217
students, and it was the second largest division in the study, representing more than 18% of the
total. The graph of the graduation rates is presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Graduation rates by semester for Transportation.
The longitudinal evaluation of these 32 cohorts established a level and a trend of
graduation rates before and after the implementation of PBF at TSTC. ITS analyses were
conducted for each academic division as well as the institution as a whole, and the results are
presented in Tables 6 through 13. In each table, the Intercept value represents the level at the
beginning of the study, Semester denotes the slope over time prior to the funding formula
change, PBF represents the level after the policy implementation, and Trend is the trend of
graduation rates after PBF. To visualize the levels and trends of graduation rates from the Fall
2005 through Spring 2016 semesters, the final regression analysis results for the institution as a
whole and for each academic division were plotted in Figures 11 through 18 and are presented
with the related table. Figures 11 through 18 also include a vertical dashed line to identify the
implementation of PBF at TSTC. Extensions of the pre-intervention trend lines are included in
each graph to compare with the actual levels and trends realized in each division and the entire
institution.
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For TSTC as a whole, the graduation rate level at the beginning of the study was 26.78%,
and the rate remained flat for cohorts through Summer 2013, increasing 0.02% per semester.
The graduation rate level increased by 1.59% after the implementation of PBF in Fall 2013, and
the slope increased to 0.85% per semester. Though the level and trend improved after PBF was
introduced, the changes were not statistically significant at p < 0.05 level. Table 6 presents the
results of the regression model, and Figure 11 illustrates the level and trends of the graduation
rates for the entire institution before and after PBF began in Fall 2013.
Table 6
Regression Model Summary for All Divisions at TSTC
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
26.782
0.028
1.585
0.849

Standard Error
1.488
0.104
3.087
0.555

t Value
17.993
0.268
0.513
1.529

p Value
0.000
0.790
0.612
0.138

73

Figure 11. Level and trend of graduation rates for all divisions at TSTC from Fall 2005 to
Spring 2016.
The graduation rate level for the Allied Health division at the beginning of the study was
42.18%, with a downward trend of -0.49% per semester before PBF began in Fall 2013. After
the initiation of the Returned Value Funding model, the trend reversed, and the graduation rate
increased by 2.11% each semester. Similarly, the level increased by 4.11% after PBF was
implemented in Fall 2013. However, the improvements in the graduation rate level and trend
were not statistically significant. The results of the regression model are listed in Table 7 and
illustrated in Figure 12.
Table 7
Regression Model Summary for Allied Health
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
42.181
-0.486
4.111
2.111

Standard Error
3.753
0.263
7.784
1.399

t Value
11.240
-1.850
0.528
1.509

p Value
0.000
0.075
0.602
0.143
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Figure 12. Level and trend of graduation rates for Allied Health from Fall 2005 to Spring 2016.
Table 8 and Figure 13 present the results of the regression model for the Business and
Professions division. The initial level of the graduation rate in the current study was 14.5% for
the division, and the trend was positive prior to the change to the Returned Value Funding
model, increasing at 0.35% each term. The graduation rate level dropped after PBF by 2.4%,
and the trend was a downward slope of -0.42% after Fall 2013. Neither the change in graduation
rate level nor the change in the trend was statistically significant.
Table 8
Regression Model Summary for Business and Professions
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
14.498
0.354
-2.401
-0.424

Standard Error
3.447
0.241
7.149
1.285

t Value
4.206
1.468
-0.336
-0.330

p Value
0.000
0.153
0.740
0.744
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Figure 13. Level and trend of graduation rates for Business and Professions from Fall 2005 to
Spring 2016.
The Computer and Information Systems division’s initial graduation rate level was
14.85%, and the trend for the graduation rate before PBF was slightly downward at -0.06%.
After the implementation of PBF in Fall 2013, the level improved by 1.72%, and the trend went
up slightly, increasing by 0.11% per semester. The increases in the graduation rate level and
trend after the change to the Returned Value Funding model were not statistically significant.
Table 9 lists the results of the regression model for the Computer and Information Systems
division, and Figure 14 displays the levels and trends before and after the implementation of the
funding model.
Table 9
Regression Model Summary for Computer and Information Systems
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
14.854
-0.060
1.724
0.108

Standard Error
1.819
0.127
3.772
0.678

t Value
8.167
-0.475
0.457
0.159

p Value
0.000
0.639
0.651
0.875
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Figure 14. Level and trend of graduation rates for Computer and Information Systems from Fall
2005 to Spring 2016.
The Engineering and Electronics division had a positive graduation rate trend at the
beginning of this study, with an increase of 0.59% per semester, and the initial level was 23.35%.
However, the trend shifted to a decrease of -0.48% per term after the implementation of the
Returned Value Funding model in Fall 2013, and after the beginning of PBF, the graduation rate
level dropped 3.9%. The changes in the trend and level of graduation rates for the Engineering
and Electronics division were not statistically significant. The output of the regression model is
presented in Table 10, and Figure 15 displays the graph of the results.
Table 10
Regression Model Summary for Engineering and Electronics
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
23.349
0.591
-3.974
-0.482

Standard Error
1.527
0.107
3.168
0.569

t Value
15.290
5.526
-1.255
-0.847

p Value
0.000
0.000
0.220
0.404
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Figure 15. Level and trend of graduation rates for Engineering and Electronics from Fall 2005
to Spring 2016.
Table 11 lists the results of the regression model for the Environmental, Safety, and
Natural Resources division, and the ITS plot for the division is shown in Figure 16. The
graduation rate level for the division at the beginning of the study was 21.44%, and trend was
positive, improving 0.34% per term. After the Returned Value Funding model was
implemented, the graduation rate level went up by 16.04%, the largest post-PBF change of any
division in this study. However, the increase was not sustained, and the graduation rate trend
following PBF decreased by 4.10% per semester. The change in level was not statistically
significant with a p value of 0.079, but the decline in the trend in graduation rates for the
Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resource division was statistically significant. This result
supported the alternative hypothesis for research question 2.
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Table 11
Regression Model Summary for Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
21.445
0.336
16.035
-4.101

Standard Error
4.23
0.296
8.783
1.579

t Value
5.065
1.135
1.826
-2.598

p Value
0.000
0.266
0.079
0.015

Figure 16. Level and trend of graduation rates for Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources
from Fall 2005 to Spring 2016.
The Industrial and Manufacturing division had the highest initial graduation rate level in
the current study at 43.27%. The trend for the division decreased by 0.56% per term prior to the
Returned Value Funding model. After PBF began in Fall 2013, the graduation rate level
increased by 9.68%, and the graduation rate trend reversed, increasing by 1.11% each semester.
Though the ITS analysis shows improvement in the graduation rate level and trend, the changes
were not statistically significant. The regression model summary for the Industrial and
Manufacturing division is listed in Table 12, and the graduation rate levels and trends for preand post-PBF are displayed in Figure 17.
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Table 12
Regression Model Summary for Industrial and Manufacturing
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
43.267
-0.560
9.679
1.109

Standard Error
3.137
0.220
6.507
1.170

t Value
13.792
-2.550
1.488
0.948

p Value
0.000
0.017
0.148
0.351

Figure 17. Level and trend of graduation rates for Industrial and Manufacturing from Fall 2005
to Spring 2016.
In the current study, the Transportation division had an initial graduation rate level of
19.76%, and the trend increased by 0.55% per term before Fall 2013. The level increased by
1.61% after the funding formula changes, the smallest change among the divisions in this study.
Similarly, the graduation rate trend remained relatively consistent, increasing by only 0.17%.
The changes in the graduation rate level and trend after the implementation of the Returned
Value Funding model were not statistically significant, and the regression model summary and
graph of the results are presented in Table 13 and Figure 18.
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Table 13
Regression Model Summary for Transportation
Intercept
Semester
PBF
Trend

Value
19.759
0.549
1.611
0.169

Standard Error
1.494
0.105
3.100
0.557

t Value
13.223
5.245
0.520
0.304

p Value
0.000
0.000
0.607
0.763

Figure 18. Level and Trend of Graduation Rates for Transportation from Fall 2005 to Spring
2016.
Summary
The current study evaluated the impact of PBF on the graduation rates at TSTC as a
whole and by academic division, and the two statistical tests provided point-in-time and
longitudinal evaluation of the samples studies. The first research question was focused on the
effects of PBF on the entire institution. The two-tailed z test for proportions of the Fall 2005 to
Fall 2013 and the Fall 2009 to Fall 2013 cohorts indicated that the changes in graduation rates
for TSTC as whole after the implementation of Returned Value Funding model were not
statistically significant. The ITS analysis for students who began in Fall 2005 through the Spring

81
2016 cohort also revealed no statistically significant changes in the graduation rate for the entire
institution after the implementation of PBF before the Fall 2013 term. Therefore, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the first research question.
The second research question explored the impact of the implementation of the Returned
Value Funding model in each academic division, repeating the statistical analyses for each
academic division. The two-tailed z test for proportions identified a statistically significant
decrease in the graduation rate in the Fall 2013 cohort of the Computer and Information Systems
division when compared with a matched population of students from Fall 2005. None of the
changes in graduation rates in the other academic divisions were statistically significant. The
ITS analyses for each division indicated a statistically significant decrease in the graduation rate
trend after the implementation of PBF in the Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources
division. None of the other changes in graduation rate levels or trends after the implementation
of PBF were statistically significant. Because of the significant findings in the Computer and
Information Systems and the Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources divisions, the null
hypothesis can be rejected for the second research question.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Since the implementation of performance-based funding (PBF) for higher education in
the late 1970s, lawmakers and policy analysts have advocated for its use as a superior
appropriation method over enrollment or activity-based formulas (Dougherty et al., 2011). PBF
models link an institution’s public funding, usually by the state legislature, to its attainment of
predetermined metrics, usually student outcomes. Twenty-six states were using PBF by 2007,
and most of these versions included additional appropriations for institutions that exceeded
targets (Hermes, 2012). Researchers referred to these early models as PBF 1.0, and through
these formulas, legislatures provided incentive funding without risking baseline funding
(Doughtery et al., 2016; Lahr et al., 2014). Many states discontinued the use of PBF during the
2000s, but lawmakers began implementing a second generation of performance-based funding
formulas, called PBF 2.0, in response to the economic downtown in the late 2000s (Dougherty et
al., 2012). PBF 2.0 eliminated the bonus funding of PBF 1.0, broadened the number of metrics
to include more intermediate measures, and placed more emphasis on degree productions
(Friedel et al., 2013; McLendon & Hearn, 2013; Reddy, 2011). Many PBF 2.0 formulas also
increased the percentage of institutions’ budgets determined by performance metrics (Mullin et
al., 2015).
Context for Study
In 2013, the 83rd Texas Legislature approved two performance-based funding formulas
for its two-year colleges: the Success Points model for the community colleges, and the
Returned Value Funding model for Texas State Technical College (TSTC). TSTC is a single
institution with 10 campuses located throughout the state, enrolling approximately 14,000
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students, and primarily offering Associate of Applied Science degrees and certificates to meet
statewide workforce needs. The Returned Value Funding formula was developed in conjunction
with college leadership, the Texas Workforce Commission, and the Texas Higher Education
Coordinating Board. Referring to TSTC’s mission of economic development and workforce
development, the model uses the workplace earnings of TSTC students as its outcome, and the
formula accounts for 100% of the recommended state appropriation. Thus, the Returned Value
Funding model incorporated recommendations from prior research, including broader
collaboration among stakeholders, alignment with institutional mission, and a high percentage of
funding determined by the formula.
Methodology and Results
To determine if the Returned Value Funding model impacted completion rates at TSTC,
the study incorporated two statistical tests to provide point-in-time and longitudinal views of
graduation rates at the institution. Specifically, the study sought to answer the following
research questions:
1. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in the overall graduation rate
at Texas State Technical College after the implementation of the Returned Value Fund
Model when compared to the graduation rate prior to the implementation of the
performance-based funding?
2. To what extent is there a statistically significant difference in graduation rate by
academic divisions after the implementation of the Returned Value Funding Model when
compared to the graduation rate prior to performance-based funding?
The two-tailed z test for proportions compared cohorts from Fall 2005 to Fall 2013 and
Fall 2009 to Fall 2013. The 2005 and 2009 groups were selected as examples of graduation rates
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before the implementation of PBF, and Fall 2013 was the first cohort of students after the
Returned Value Funding model. Using a matched sample method, students from Fall 2005 and
Fall 2009 were matched to students from Fall 2013 based on demographic markers found by
Hendricks (2000) to be the best predictors of graduation at TSTC. Only non-dual credit students
who declared an Associate of Applied Science, Level 1 Certificate, or Level 2 Certificate were
included in the sample, and each academic division listed in Appendix A was independently
evaluated, as well as the institution as a whole. In all, 16 statistical analyses were conducted,
eight for each matched set, to determine if any changes in graduation rates observed between the
sets were statistically significant. For the 2005 to 2013 and 2009 to 2013 matched sets for the
entire institution, the graduation rates decreased, but this difference was not statistically
significant. The change in graduation rate in the Computer Information Systems division
between Fall 2005 and Fall 2013 was the only statistically significant result, a decrease of 8.38%.
An interrupted time series (ITS) analysis was used to determine the statistical
significance of any changes in the level or trend of graduation rates after the implementation of
PBF at TSTC. As with the z test, the population included only non-dual credit students who
declared an Associate of Applied Science, Level 1 Certificate, or Level 2 Certificate. The
timeframe of the ITS tests extended from the Fall 2005 semester through students who graduated
by the Summer 2017 semester. In addition to the statistical tables for each coefficient, the
regression analyses were plotted for the institution as a whole and each academic division, with
extensions of the pre-PBF trend lines included for comparison. The ITS tests revealed the levels
and trends of graduations rates changed for the institution as a whole and for the academic
divisions, but most of the impacts were not statistically significant. The only statistically
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significant change after the implementation of PBF was a decrease in the trend of the graduation
rates for the Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources division.
Findings Related to Prior Research
By 2015, 32 states were using PBF to fund public higher education, but the metrics and
allocation percentages varied by state and, in some cases, by type of institution. Researchers
studying PBF implementation found many college leaders opposed PBF because of their belief
the formulas were ineffective and misaligned with institutional mission (Fryar et al., 2012;
Huisman & Curry, 2004; Rabovsky, 2014). Studies also showed the opposition of educational
administrators, political turnover, and budget shortfalls influenced legislatures in some states to
discontinue PBF (Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Dougherty et al., 2012; Dougherty et al., 2016a).
Researchers studying the impact of PBF models observed that because the models vary,
comparison of outcomes among states was difficult and imprecise (Ewell & Jones, 2006;
Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Tandberg, 2008; Thornton & Friedel, 2016). Nonetheless,
studies of PBF in Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee found no evidence of
improvement in graduation or retention rates (Dougherty et al., 2016b); Hillman et al., 2014;
Shin, 2010; Umbricht et al., 2015). Mullin and Honeyman (2008) studied the PBF model used in
Florida community colleges from 2005 to 2008 and found while institutional budgets increased,
remedial and adult education programs decreased as colleges appeared to shift operations to
activities with higher fiscal returns. A study of Washington’s PBF formula for community and
technical colleges revealed little impact on retention rates or associate degrees, but Hillman et al.
(2015) did observe an increase in short-term certificates. Tandberg et al. (2014) examined the
impact of PBF among 19 states from 1990 through 2010 and found little evidence of increased
completion by community college students, and they noted that most formulas were designed to
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provide higher levels of funding for full-time students, though these students were the minority
of the total enrollment. This finding was consistent with reports by Burke and Minassians (2003)
and McKinney and Hagedorn (2015) which questioned the alignment of PBF with the
demographics, operations, or missions of community colleges.
Discussion
The study of TSTC’s Returned Value Funding model built upon the existing literature on
the impact of PBF at the state level by examining a single institution within Texas, and further
exploring the effect of PBF on individual academic divisions. The results of the two statistical
tests addressed the research questions regarding graduation rates at TSTC as a whole and by
academic division.
PBF Impact on Entire Institution. The first research question in this study focused on
the impact of PBF on graduation rates at TSTC overall. Prior research found that PBF had little
or no effect on graduation rates at a state level, but the literature review for this study did not
reveal any studies on single institutions within a state using performance funding. In the current
study, the matched samples of TSTC students from Fall 2005 and Fall 2009 graduated at a higher
percentage than the corresponding matched samples from Fall 2013. These differences, 2.90%
and 0.90% respectively, were not statistically significant, and they provided only a point-in-time
examination of the impact of the Returned Value Funding model. The lower graduation rate in
the Fall 2013 may be indicative of the TSTC’s adjustment to PBF. This possibility is
strengthened by the longitudinal results of the ITS study. Spanning 32 semesters, the analysis of
the ITS for TSTC as a whole showed a level increase and positive trend in graduation rates after
the implementation of PBF. The ITS analysis concurred with the z test finding that the Returned
Value Funding model did not have a statistically significant impact on overall graduation rates at
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TSTC. However, the graduation rate increased at a higher rate than the extension of the preimplementation trend line, suggesting that the institution was improving in achieving the
outcome goal of higher graduation rates. Nonetheless, growth in graduation rates at TSTC
overall during the time period of the study was not statistically significant nor can it be attributed
to the introduction of PBF.
PBF Impact on Academic Divisions. The second research question investigated the
impact of PBF on related program groups. A review of the literature for this study did not find
any research on individual institutions, and dialogue with other researchers indicated there were
no studies of performance funding at the program level as well (M. D’Amico, personal
communication, April 7, 2017; N. Hillman, personal communication, May 5, 2017). The twotailed z test on the sets of 2005 to 2013 and 2009 to 2013 matched students in each academic
division found mixed results, with most divisions decreasing in graduation rates. Similar to the
institution as a whole, this drop in the graduation rate immediately after the implementation of
PBF in 2013 may be indicative of the institution adapting to the new funding formula. The only
statistically significant change was a decrease in the graduation rate from Fall 2005 to Fall 2013
for the Computer and Information Systems division. This division represented the largest
number of matched sets (346) in the sample, and its 2013 graduation rate (17.05%) was the
lowest among all divisions in the set. If the Computer and Information System division matches
were removed from the Fall 2005 to Fall 2013 comparison, the graduation rate still decreased,
but by 1.1% instead of 2.9%. Despite the division’s large contribution to the total sample, it is
noteworthy that difference in graduation rates for the 2005 to 2013 Computer and Information
Systems matches would not have been statistical significant at the p < 0.05 level if only eight
additional students had completed in the 2013 sample. Indeed, a long-term view of the
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graduation rates in the Computer and Information Systems (Figure 13) indicates little variation in
graduation rates when compared to the point-in-time analysis of the z test.
When examining the ITS results and regression plots for each division, the changes in
graduation rates after Fall 2013 become more apparent. While not statistically significant, the
increases in the levels and reversal in trends of graduation rates for the Allied Health (Figure 11)
and Industrial and Manufacturing (Figure 16) divisions suggest other factors affected graduation
rates in those divisions. Those changes cannot be attributed to the implementation of the
Returned Value Funding model, but they do indicate the institutional capacity to improve
completion rates.
The ITS analysis for the Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources division (Table
11) revealed an increase in the graduation rate level with a p value of 0.079. While not
significant at the p < 0.05 level, this result is important when coupled with the impact of PBF on
the division’s graduation rate trend. The trend decreased at a statistically significant rate of
greater than 4% per term for the seven semesters following the implementation of PBF in Fall
2013. This included zero graduates in the division from the Summer 2015 cohort, but even if the
graduation rate that term had been equal to the intercept (21.45%), the trend would have
remained significantly negative. This finding suggests the programs in the Environmental,
Safety, and Natural Resources division were poorly suited to sustain higher graduation rates
under the Returned Value Funding model or the division was operationally unable to fully adapt
to PBF. In either case, the negative trend in this division is an example of the potential negative
impact of PBF at the program level.
Overall, the impacts of the Returned Value Funding model on TSTC were mixed, but
mostly null, not significantly impacting graduation rates at TSTC. These results are consistent
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with previous quantitative examinations of the impact of PBF on graduation rates. From early
studies on the Tennessee model (Shin & Milton, 2004; Shin, 2010) to long-term studies of
community colleges in multiple states (Tandberg et al., 2015), researchers have found that
performance funding does not consistently improve graduation rates, and this study extends
similar conclusions to the institutional and program levels. Researchers in previous studies made
recommendations to improve outcomes of subsequent PBF formulas, and some of these
suggestions were addressed in the Returned Value Funding model (Dougherty et al., 2011;
Rabovsky, 2014). The current study found, however, the modifications also did not achieve the
intended results at TSTC.
Recommendations
The Returned Value Funding model was implemented by the 83rd Texas Legislature in
2013, and this study established a baseline of results for TSTC. Though the results indicated
limited impact, the institution should regularly update the regression analysis of graduation rates
and conduct ongoing review of the outcomes. Continued examination at the division level will
also help identify program areas with decreasing graduation rates before significant state funding
is affected.
McKinney and Hagedorn (2015) identified the risk of using metrics in PBF formulas that
do not account for at-risk populations, and unlike the Texas community college model, the
Returned Value Funding design for TSTC includes no weight for different populations.
Consistent with the resource dependency theory, the institution may begin to shift instructional
and student services to favor students more likely to result in larger state appropriations. Policy
makers and college leaders should incorporate revisions to the Returned Value Funding model to
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include incentives for TSTC to fully serve all eligible students in Texas based on their needs and
contributions to the state economy.
Finally, there are two areas recommended for further research. First, the statistical
analyses of this study examined TSTC as a single institution, and it did not differentiate among
the campuses around the state or student demographics. Given the diverse geography and
population of Texas, researchers should conduct a similar study at each TSTC location separately
or by key student demographics, such as gender, ethnicity, or academic and economic
disadvantage. Secondly, further study should inquire about the organizational changes at TSTC
as a result of PBF. Researchers should consider a qualitative study to examine unintended
consequences or employee perceptions, and would include TSTC faculty, staff, and
administrators. The research by Thornton and Friedel (2016) provides an applicable framework
for such a study.
Conclusion
Performance-based funding continues to evolve as policy advocates and lawmakers seek
greater accountability for public investments in higher education. Early models that offered
incentive funds for achieving goals have been replaced by formulas that require meeting targets
for baseline funding. Some of the problems with PBF identified by prior research, such as lack
of collaboration, inadequate funding, and alignment with mission, were addressed in the design
of Returned Value Funding model implemented at TSTC in Fall 2013. Despite these
improvements to the formula, this study showed PBF did not significantly impact graduation
rates at the institution. While the goal of improved completions may be appropriate for TSTC,
sustained and meaningful changes to two-year college graduation rates are more complex than a
shift to an exclusive focus on outcomes. Ongoing research should inform future revisions to
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performance-based funding formulas to ensure that institutions are appropriately supported to
fulfill their mission, creating opportunities for students to enroll, persist, advance, and complete a
quality postsecondary education.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Academic Divisions and Related Programs
Academic Divisions
Allied Health

Business and Professions

Computer and Information Systems

Related Program
Certified Nurse Assistant
Chemical Dependency Counseling
Dental Assistant
Dental Laboratory Technology
Dental Hygiene
Emergency Medical Technology
Health Information Technology
Licensed Vocational Nurse
Massage Therapy
Medical Assistant
Medical Insurance Coding
Pharmacy Technician
Registered Nurse
Surgical Technology
Accounting Technician
Administrative Assistant and Secretarial
Business Management Technology
Culinary Arts
Data Entry
Education and Training
Legal Secretary
Logistics Technology
Office Supervision and Management
Professional Office Technology
Software and Business Management
Accounting
Technical/Business Writing
Animation, Graphics, and Special Effects
Technology
Cloud and Data Center Computing
Technology
Commercial Advertising and Arts
Technology
Computer and Information Systems Security
Technology
Computer Installation Technology
Computer Maintenance Technology
Computer Networking and Systems
Administration
Computer Programming Technology
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Computer Science Technology
Computer Support Technology
Cyber Security Technology
Database and Web Programming Technology
Digital Media Technology
E-commerce Technology
Gaming and Simulation Programming
Graphic Design Technology
Information Science and Systems Technology
Instructional Media Design Technology
Network Information Management
Technology
Software Development Technology
System, Networking, and LAN/WAN
Management Technology
Web Design and Development Technology
Visual Communications Technology
Architectural Drafting and Design
Engineering and Electronics
Technology
Biomedical Equipment Technology
Cartography Drafting Technology
Drafting and Design Technology
Electrical Power and Controls Technology
Electromechanical Technology
Electronic Communications Technology
Electronics Technology
Energy Management Technology
Engineering Analysis and Design Technology
Industrial Controls Technology
Instrumentation Technology
Laser Electro-Optics Technology
Mechanical Engineering Technology
Mechatronics Technology
Process Operations Technology
Robotics Technology
Surveying Technology
Telecommunications Technology
Environmental, Safety, and Natural Resources Agriculture Technology
Chemical Technology
Environmental Technology
Horticulture Service Technology
Nuclear Power Technology
Occupational Safety Compliance
Radiation Protection Technology
Solar Energy Technology
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Industrial and Manufacturing

Transportation

Turfgrass and Landscape Management
Construction Electrician Technology
Construction Technology
Electrical Lineworker Technology
HVAC Technology
Industrial Maintenance Technology
Industrial Systems Technology
Plumbing Technology
Precision Machining Technology
Tool and Die Technology
Welding Technology
Air Traffic Controller
Aircraft Airframe Technology
Aircraft Dispatch Technology
Aircraft Pilot Training
Aircraft Powerplant Technology
Auto Collision Technology
Automotive Technology
Aviation Management Technology
Avionics Technology
Diesel Equipment Technology
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Appendix B: RStudio Code for Interrupted Time Series
#ITS Dissertation Code
# Convert rate decimal to percentage
data$rate <- data$rate * 100
# Plot outcome variable versus time
plot(data$semester,data$rate,
ylab="Graduation Rate (%)",
ylim=c(0,65),
xlab="Semester",
type="l",
col="black",
xaxt="n")
# Add x-axis year labels
axis(1, at=1:32, labels=data$term)
# Add in the points for the figure
points(data$semester,data$rate,
col="black",
pch=20)
# Label the time of change to PBF
abline(v=24.5,lty=2)
# Preliminary OLS regression
model_ols <- lm(rate ~ semester + PBF + trend, data=data)
summary(model_ols)
confint (model_ols)
# Durbin-watson test
dwt(model_ols,max.lag=3,alternative="two.sided")
# Graph the residuals from the OLS regression to check for serially correlated errors
plot
(data$semester,
residuals(model_ols),
type='o',
pch=16,
xlab='Semester',
ylab='OLS Residuals',
col="red")
abline(h=0,lty=2)
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# Plot ACF and PACF
# Set plotting to two records on one page
par(mfrow=c(1,2))
# Produce plots
acf(residuals(model_ols))
acf(residuals(model_ols),type='partial')
########################
# Plot results
#########################
# First plot the raw data points for the Graduation Rate
plot(data$semester[1:32],data$rate[1:32],
ylim=c(0,65),
ylab="Graduation Rate (%)",
xlab="Semester",
pch=20,
col="black",
xaxt="n")
# Add x-axis year labels
axis(1, at=1:32, labels=data$term[1:32])
# Label the policy change Fall 2013
abline(v=24.5,lty=2)
# Plot the first line segment for the intervention group
lines(data$semester[1:24], fitted(model_ols)[1:24], col="black",lwd=2)
# Add the second line segment for the intervention group
lines(data$semester[25:32], fitted(model_ols)[25:32], col="black",lwd=2)
# Add the counterfactual for the intervention group
segments(1,
(model_ols$coefficients[1] + model_ols$coefficients[2]),32,
(model_ols$coefficients[1] +model_ols$coefficients[2]*32),
lty=2,
lwd=2,
col="black")
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